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ABSTRACT 
Government agencies in Canada are increasingly using collaborative approaches to inform 
decision-making for complex policy problems. Collaborative approaches encourage participants 
to share resources and knowledge to build a working relationship for confronting mutual 
challenges and determining agreeable solutions. It is often assumed that collaborative approaches 
are cost effective, and lead to solutions that are easier to implement than conventional 
government decisions. However, a significant challenge is the tendency of government to 
undermine collaborative processes by setting aside the decisions reached by the collaborative 
body. This can result in participants being unreceptive to further government actions and blocking 
implementation because they feel their opinions were not respected. Low Water Response in 
Ontario was selected to study how outcomes are incorporated into government decision-making 
and whether outcomes are being protected by government. Three case studies in southern Ontario 
were chosen based on their experiences with severe low water conditions. The Institutional 
Analysis and Development framework was used to structure research. This framework studies 
contextual characteristics, decision-making structures, how participants interact, outcomes, and 
evaluation to answer research questions. Provincial, watershed and individual scales of analysis 
were investigated. Interviews assessed the perspectives of stakeholders in water response teams 
including provincial government, municipalities, conservation authorities and large-scale water 
users (over 50,000L/day). Document analysis provided contextual information and key factors 
regarding Low Water Response implementation. Personal observations provided an opportunity 
to cross-check information from interviews and document analysis. Findings show that the 
provincial government incorporated the input of each case study similarly, but each WRT felt 
differently about whether outcomes were being protected by the government. Largely outcomes 
are respected by government in Low Water Response despite the fact that the most serious level 
of drought response (Level 3) has never been declared even though conditions for declaring Level 
3 have been met on multiple occasions. There were many positive social outcomes that were 
evident from collaboration and participants felt that the process was beneficial. 
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 Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1 Problem Context 
Innovative decision-making is required to resolve complex policy problems that are common in 
water resources management. Conventional government approaches to these challenges have led 
to solutions that do not necessarily protect the environment, that are cost intensive, time-
consuming, and that trigger administrative disagreements (Ryan and Bidwell 2007). Conventional 
government decision-making is characterized by top-down, government-centric control that 
prioritizes technical and expert based solutions (Watson, et al. 2009). An alternative to 
conventional government problem solving that is growing in popularity is collaboration. 
Collaborative approaches encourage sharing resources and knowledge among multiple 
stakeholders to build a working relationship and collectively confront mutual challenges (Gray 
1985). 
 Collaborative approaches emerged in the United States during the 1980s and proliferated in 
many countries and fields, including social studies, business, and environmental governance 
(Ryan and Bidwell 2007; Selsky and Parker 2005). The use of collaborative approaches for 
decision-making expanded in environmental fields because: command and control approaches for 
protecting the environment were perceived as ineffective (Bidwell and Ryan 2006); the public 
were demanding a greater role in decision-making (Bidwell and Ryan 2006; Robinson, et al. 
2011); and government was downloading responsibilities to non-government agencies and lower 
government levels (Conteh 2013; Koontz 2005; Taylor, et al. 2009). 
Collaborative approaches continue to be used for complex policy problems because it is 
assumed by practitioners that outcomes resulting from collaboration are easier to implement and 
more cost-effective than conventional government solutions (Bidwell and Ryan 2006; Connick 
and Innes 2003; Emerson, et al. 2012; Hardy 2010; Lockwood, et al. 2010; Robinson, et al. 
2011). In some cases, collaborative processes are actually created by governments. Government-
led collaboration can more specifically be defined as “a governance arrangement where one or 
more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making 
process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement 
public policy or manage public programs or assets” (Ansell and Gash 2007, 544). Complex 
policy environments require cooperation among multiple agencies, levels of government and non-
government actors to implement policy (Conteh 2013; von Korff, et al. 2012).  
As governments increasingly use collaborative approaches to inform decision-making, 
challenges have begun to emerge. A significant challenge is the tendency of government to 
nullify collaborative processes by not incorporating outcomes into final government decisions 
(Kallis, et al. 2009). This challenge may stem from a misunderstanding of the role collaborative 
processes play in representative democracies (Kallis, et al. 2009; Smiley, et al. 2010). 
Understanding the challenges that governments face in effectively using collaborative approaches 
is important for improving decision-making and the impact from decisions.   
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Many authors have identified the need for continued and context-specific research 
investigating the inclusion of collaborative bodies in formal government decision-making 
(Emerson, et al. 2012; Hardy 2010; Holman 2013; Ryan and Bidwell 2007). Furthermore, the 
environmental management literature has detailed cases where governments have failed to follow 
through with collaboratively determined outcomes (Kallis, et al. 2009; Richie, et al. 2012). This 
has led to the dissolution of these processes and group members being resistant to future 
government action because they feel slighted (Kallis, et al. 2009; Richie, et al. 2012). 
Understanding the relationship that forms between collaborative bodies and government and the 
impacts of superseding the outcomes of collaborative processes would provide clearer results of 
what government-led collaborative processes actually produce.  
Outcomes in collaborative processes can be considered “the effects of the collaborative 
process and its outputs on changing social and environmental conditions” (Mandarano 2008, 
457). Outputs are the tangible products that are created by collaborative processes, such as 
management plans. The importance of measuring tangible and intangible outcomes from 
collaborative processes has been emphasized for over a decade (Connick and Innes 2003; Koontz 
and Thomas 2006). Early evaluations of collaborative processes focused on process and social 
outcomes (Mandarano and Paulsen 2011). However, increasing emphasis is being placed on the 
importance of evaluating the impact and implementation of collaborative processes (Koontz and 
Thomas 2006; Ryan and Bidwell 2007). Determining whether government is respecting the 
outcomes from collaborative bodies requires comparing the outcomes reached by the 
collaborative body with the government’s final outcome.  
A number of frameworks have been created that attempt to determine the strengths and 
weaknesses of various collaborative arrangements (Sabatier, et al. 2005). Some of the most 
popular frameworks for assessing collaborative processes include the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier, et al. 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007) and the Institutional Analysis and 
Development (IAD) framework (Imperial 1999; Ostrom 2011). A framework that suits the 
contextual setting of the collaborative process can be helpful for evaluating collaborative groups. 
For instance the IAD framework is beneficial for studying collaborative situations where 
decision-making happens at multiple levels or if detailed knowledge is required for how decisions 
are made and by whom. These characteristics make the IAD framework ideal for investigating 
government-led collaborative processes. 
Governments are increasingly using collaborative approaches to inform decision-making. 
Thus, it is essential to clarify the relationship between governments and collaborative groups 
(Gerlak 2008; Newig and Fritsch 2009), and to ensure that inputs from collaborative groups are 
incorporated into final government decision-making (Ison 2010). Ontario Low Water Response 
(LWR) provides the opportunity for a case study to investigate the relationship between 
government and collaborative bodies, and to determine whether governments are protecting 
outcomes in Ontario, Canada. LWR uses local, collaborative water response teams (WRT) to 
ameliorate the impacts of low water in watersheds. The team deliberates on local watershed 
conditions to determine the severity of low water and plans response options including 
conservation, restrictions and regulation based on three response levels. The most dire 
designation is Level 3. At Level 3 the Ministry of Environment (MOE) is responsible for limiting 
water taking through the Permit to Take Water program (PTTW). The decision to enter a Level 1 
or 2 designation is decided by the WRT, but at a Level 3 the control is relinquished to the Ontario 
Water Directors Committee (OWDC). A Level 3 has never been designated in Ontario despite 
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conditions on-the-ground that characterize the necessity for declaring a Level 3 and 
recommendations from WRTs to issue a Level 3. Declining the recommendation of WRTs to 
declare a Level 3 raises the potential that the government is not protecting outcomes from 
collaborative bodies.   
1.2 Research Purpose and Objectives 
The purpose of this research is to investigate a government initiated collaborative process to 
understand how outcomes from collaborative groups are incorporated into final government 
decisions and to what extent governments are protecting collaborative outcomes. 
The research objectives are to: 
1) Establish a conceptual framework that builds on the IAD framework to understand the 
link between government and collaborative bodies and to evaluate how government 
protects outcomes.  
2) Apply the conceptual framework to the case study of Ontario LWR to determine how the 
Government of Ontario uses decisions from WRTs and whether the government is using 
recommendations put forward by WRTs in final decision-making. 
1.3 Thesis Organization  
This thesis is organized into six chapters. This first chapter reviewed the key research concepts, 
defined important terms and outlined the purpose and objectives of the study. The second chapter 
expands on Chapter One to provide an in-depth overview of the collaborative governance and 
environmental management literatures; the conceptual framework is presented at the end of the 
chapter. Chapter Three explains the research methods used to gather data. The fourth chapter 
elaborates on LWR in Ontario and details the contextual settings for each case study. Chapter 
Five presents the results of analysis. Finally, Chapter Six discusses how this research contributes 
to collaborative governance literature and outlines opportunities for further research. Chapter Six 
also discusses recommendations to governments for including collaborative processes into 
decision-making and steps to protect outcomes from collaborative bodies. 
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2 Chapter 2 
 
Literature Review 
Chapter Two establishes the background for researching collaborative processes, specifically 
government-led arrangements and the nature of outcomes from collaborative approaches to 
decision-making. Four broad themes are discussed in this chapter: (1) the characteristics of 
government-led collaborative processes; (2) evaluation of collaborative outcomes; (3) institutions 
and collaborative processes; and (4) the IAD framework. Theme 1 differentiates types of multi-
actor approaches to decision-making and characterizes government-led collaborative processes. 
This assists in understanding evaluation methods in Theme 2 that are specific to government-led 
collaborative approaches. Institutional aspects of collaborative processes and institutional change 
are introduced in Theme 3 to provide a foundation for understanding the IAD framework (Theme 
4), which is focused on institutions. The IAD framework is central to the conceptual framework 
presented at the end of this chapter. The IAD framework is useful for understanding government-
led collaborative approaches to decision-making because it examines multiple scales, considers 
context and investigates details of the decision-making process.     
2.1 Theme 1: Government-led Collaborative Processes  
2.1.1 Distinguishing Types of Participatory Governance  
There are many terms for multi-actor arrangements that involve collective decision-making. 
Central to these participatory governance methods is that participants share decision-making 
authority and have a stake in the outcome of the arrangements (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). 
Definitions and processes for these terms are numerous, continually evolving and have an 
overlapping nature. Within each arrangement there are differences in group formality and the 
extent to which multiple perspectives are integrated, ranging from providing information or 
consultation to a formal role in deliberation and final decision-making, see Figure 2.1 (Carlsson 
and Berkes 2005; Cowie and Borrett 2005). Partnerships, co-management and collaborative 
governance are the most common terms used in participatory natural resource management and 
are further distinguished to understand their characteristics.  
Figure 2.1 Degrees of Participant Authority in Decision-making 
 
  
                                                                     (Adapted from: Cowie and Borrett 2005) 
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Partnerships are a “process of building new social relationships among actors from different 
segments of society” (Newell, et al. 2012, 375). Partners work in their area of comparative 
advantage to promote collective group objectives (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). Actors who 
are included in the process tend to already have a presence in decision-making; involvement of 
marginalized voices is uncommon (Newell, et al. 2012). Partnerships are less autonomous and 
often dissolve after the task has been completed, but may re-emerge if a shared challenge returns.  
Co-management is “a process by which private and public actors cooperate, and share 
power, in order to solve problems related to natural resource management” (Carlsson and 
Sandstrom 2008, 36). The term connotes decision-making between the government and another 
actor that has a stake in the outcome (Plummer, et al. 2006). In practice, co-management involves 
multiple government departments and numerous local participants (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). 
Co-management is strongly rooted in property rights and environmental management. It 
emphasizes power-sharing as an influential outcome from the process of working together 
(Carlsson and Berkes 2005).  
Collaborative approaches to environmental problem solving emphasize the deliberative 
nature of negotiation among stakeholders (Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). This deliberation 
promotes information sharing among actors (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). The processes tend to be 
long-term and aim to build lasting relationships among participants. The term collaborative will 
be used to frame this research because it fits the criteria for collaborative processes determined by 
Ansell and Gash (2007). Criteria include:  
 Collaborative processes are initiated by an agency;   
 Involve non-state actors;  
 Are formally organized and meet collectively;  
 Prioritize consensus decision-making; 
 Include stakeholders in decision-making; and  
 The focus of the collaborative body is public policy or management.  
Collaboration is an umbrella term for a number of multi-actor arrangements, which might 
include stewardship groups, local management organizations, or business ventures. In order to 
differentiate types of collaborative governance arrangements, initiatives can be grouped by 
characteristics to better understand the subtleties within the broader concept of collaborative 
processes (Moore and Koontz 2003). One classification method distinguishes collaborative 
approaches by the actor who initiated the process into government-led, citizen-led and hybrid 
(Center for Watershed Protection 1998; Moore and Koontz 2003). Hybrid groups include 
members of local and/or regional governments and land managers, who make recommendations 
for government decision-making (Center for Watershed Protection 1998). Citizen-based groups 
often play an advocacy role in bringing issues to attention or taking steps within their capacity to 
improve local conditions. Government-based groups engage the public in an advisory or 
temporary capacity to better inform decision-making; see Figure 2.2 for the structure of a typical 
government-led collaboration in the United States.  
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Figure 2.2 Structure of government-led collaborative approaches  
 
 
                                                                                  (Center for Watershed Protection 1998) 
2.1.2 Government-led Collaborative Processes 
Government-led collaborative processes are the focus of this research. In this type of process 
disagreements may result over what outcomes should be and whether the government perceives 
outcomes as ‘legally and administratively feasible’ (Robinson, et al. 2011).  Locally based 
collaborative groups that are usually initiated by citizen groups tend to be able to implement 
outcomes more easily. This may be due to the direct link that members on the collaborative team 
have with their communities or the nature of the outcomes being voluntary action (Robinson, et 
al. 2011). Government-led and citizen-led collaborative processes vary in focus, decision-making 
structure and outcomes (Robinson, et al. 2011). Understanding the key aspects of government-led 
and policy based collaborative approaches is important because they have different methods of 
implementation and measures of effectiveness than other collaborative arrangements (Margerum 
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2008). However, there are multiple arrangements for collaborative decision-making even within 
government-led processes. Differences among government-led collaborative processes might 
include the complexity of the issue being addressed, capacity and history (Margerum 2008; 
Moore and Koontz 2003). Understanding the design features of collaborative groups and the 
differences between them will assist in determining an appropriate approach for the given 
problem.  
Government-led collaborative approaches to decision-making are often used in situations 
where the issues are largely unknown, the issue is complex or the community is not organized 
(Center for Watershed Protection 1998; Moore and Koontz 2003). The decision to use a 
collaborative process for informing government is not politically neutral (Newell, et al. 2012). 
There are a number of reasons why government decides to initiate collaborative approaches to 
supplement decision-making, including informing contentious or complex policy issues. There 
are also political implications for collaborative processes that are initiated by government. 
Funding and implementation efforts of governments rise and fall based on the political party in 
office (Robinson, et al. 2011). Unstable funding and implementation efforts make it difficult for 
collaborative groups to function well.  
There is often a “complex formal structure” that outlines how government-led collaborative 
groups form, make decisions and the scope of outcomes (Robinson, et al. 2011). If the role of the 
collaborative group closely mirrors the responsibilities of a government agency, then the 
complexity of decision-making may increase because there are multiple overlapping institutional 
structures that perform similar tasks (Biermann, et al. 2007; Meadowcroft 2007). The structure of 
government-led collaboration remains largely hierarchical as the government retains final 
decision-making authority. Government initiated collaborative bodies tend to operate within 
formal policy initiatives or legislation (Robinson, et al. 2011). In government-led collaborative 
processes a government representative tends to take on a lead role either consciously or 
unintentionally because they represent a legitimate body and are supplying resources (Provan and 
Kenis 2007). This may result in asymmetrical power relations within the collaborative body. The 
dominant roles that governments play in decision-making make it difficult for collaborative 
processes to steer into different or untried territories (Ananda and Proctor 2013). However, the 
role of government can be critical for fostering success in collaborative initiatives as their 
inclusion can facilitate distribution of resources and legitimacy for the process (Provan and Kenis 
2007). 
Government often focuses on organizational or policy types of collaborative approaches 
that operate at a higher administrative level and use policies and programs to effect change 
(Margerum 2008). This is in comparison to action-based collaborative approaches that usually 
create education plans, monitoring or restoration. Policy-level outcomes have broader scale 
significance and decisions will likely affect national, provincial or regional areas (Margerum 
2008).  
Policy-based collaborative groups normally attempt to create change by providing input to 
government that will create more integrative and representative policies and programs (Margerum 
2008). Policy-based collaborative groups accomplish their goals through consensus for policies to 
improve the likelihood of efficient and effective implementation (Margerum 2008). By 
integrating multiple views into the policy, proponents argue, implementation will be improved 
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because the organizations that will be affected by the policy will have provided their input and 
support.  
The implementation of outcomes from collaborative processes varies depending on the 
political climate, type of product the collaborative body is producing and goals and objectives of 
the initiative. Government-led implementation may change over time depending on the political 
appeal for action and available funding (Robinson, et al. 2011). Collaborative approaches to 
inform government decision-making are time consuming and often considerable time passes 
before the implementation phase begins (Robinson, et al. 2011). It can be difficult for 
government to amalgamate inputs from collaborative bodies into implementable decisions that 
also reflect government priorities and public concerns (Robinson, et al. 2011).  
2.2 Theme 2: Outcome Evaluation and Protection  
2.2.1 Outcome Evaluation 
The challenge of identifying appropriate evaluation criteria for collaborative outcomes emerged 
in the 2000s and prompted debate about what should be measured and how to indicate ‘success’ 
(Koontz and Thomas 2006; McGuire 2006). The importance of measuring process and social 
outcomes and tangible and intangible outcome in collaborative initiatives had been used to judge 
success in collaboration for over a decade (Connick and Innes 2003). The focus on intangible 
outcomes, such as social capital and improved communication, has proliferated in the literature 
due to collaborative processes producing many intangible benefits that are often lost in formal 
evaluations (Conley and Moote 2003; Connick and Innes 2003; Rogers and Weber 2010).  
Collaborative processes have a propensity to achieve ‘soft’ results that benefit individuals 
participating, but are not leveraged to the broader community or region (Newell, et al. 2012). It 
has also been suggested that process and social outcomes do not correlate to effective 
implementation or improved environmental conditions (Leach and Sabatier 2005; Mandarano and 
Paulsen 2011). Lubell and Leach (2005) postulate that “any social accomplishments are largely 
symbolic and transitory if they do not translate into resolving the underlying environmental 
problems and/or conflicts” (3). Direct measures of implementation are required to understand 
whether outcomes are being achieved, goals met, and outcomes protected. The current standard 
for understanding the success of collaborative processes is to evaluate the social, process and 
impact criteria (Mandarano 2008; Rogers and Weber 2010).  
Collaborative processes have not met some proponents’ expectations in terms of their 
capacity to effectively solve challenging issues (Ananda and Proctor 2013; Newell, et al. 2012). 
However, it is also possible that collaborative processes are successful, but outcome evaluation 
may be unsuccessful (Lamie and Ball 2010). Stakeholders have identified successful components 
of collaboration even in cases that have not accomplished the overall aim of the collaborative 
process (Rudeen, et al. 2012). Measuring the outcomes of public actions is necessary to ensure 
accountability of the process (Hibbard and Lurie 2012). Without proving that goals have been 
met or tangible outcomes implemented it is impossible to determine the initiative’s success or 
advise on the use of collaborative processes for future decision-making.  
A common difficulty for collaborative processes is determining indicators for success to 
understand whether outcomes are being achieved (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). Despite the 
emphasis on indicators of success for collaborative processes a standard has not been established 
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to understand the progress or success of collaborative processes. This may reflect the differences 
in context, goals and participant inclusion specific to each collaborative process and the dilemma 
of measuring the short-term responsiveness of the environment to decision-making in an 
environment that reacts over the long term (Mandarano and Paulsen 2011). 
2.2.2 Outcome Protection 
One of the main advantages of using collaborative approaches for informing government 
decision-making is the government’s ability to receive a consensus from those affected by policy 
or program decisions (Margerum 2008). This is expected to create an environment that will 
facilitate easy implementation of the final policy or program. However, if participants believe that 
the final decision overlooked their input or they do not have power to determine or alter local 
conditions the policy or program may fail or take a long time to implement with large public 
criticism (de Loë and Kreutzwiser 2007; Richie, et al. 2012). As outlined in the previous section, 
understanding the social, process and impact of collaborative groups is essential to evaluating 
collaborative processes.  
The social elements of evaluation include the benefits that members and society receive 
from the process. Stakeholder involvement contributes to plan quality (Benson, et al. 2014) and 
helps to build ownership of the outcomes (Blackstock, et al. 2012). Participants should be 
satisfied by the outcomes that were reached because their input should be reflected in final 
decisions. In order for participants to be satisfied with the process and outcomes they should feel 
that the process produced ‘meaningful’ results (Ansell and Gash 2007). In agreeing to participate 
in a collaborative process, stakeholders become responsible for the outcomes produced (Ansell 
and Gash 2007). Therefore, they must be satisfied with the outcomes if they are expected to have 
a role in seeing them achieved. If team members believe that the outcomes of a process will be 
unsatisfactory during deliberation they may drop out of the process believing it to be ineffective 
(Richie, et al. 2012). Participants usually volunteer their time and resources to take part in 
collaborative approaches to decision-making. Participants have expectations about what will be 
produced given their personal inputs (Ansell and Gash 2007). It is important to take steps to align 
member expectations with the mandate and capabilities of collaborative groups (Richie, et al. 
2012). Engagement increases if there is correlation between participation and efficacy (Ansell 
and Gash 2007). 
Process indicators measure whether the method of decision-making and deliberation was 
successful. One key attribute of ensuring that participants’ ideas are incorporated into outcomes is 
supporting their views and opinions during deliberation (Ananda and Proctor 2013; Ansell and 
Gash 2007). It is important to ensure that stakeholders are integrated into active deliberation and 
have their opinions heard and discussed (Ansell and Gash 2007). If all stakeholders are not 
treated as equals they may feel disrespected and lose appreciation for the process and outcomes 
(Richie, et al. 2012).  
Deliberation between state and non-state actors in collaborative settings is assumed to 
improve democratic participation; these processes include decision making through consensus, 
and building social capital through citizens’ increased knowledge in issues and improved civic 
skills (Carr, et al. 2012; Mandarano and Paulsen 2011; Michels 2011). Furthermore, collaborative 
approaches provide the opportunity to better incorporate local and experience-based information, 
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which provides context. This public deliberation and local input creates support for outcomes and 
reduces resistance to implementation (Carr, et al. 2012; Michels 2011).  
Government tends to supply the technical information that is the basis for collaborative 
decision-making. Government-led collaborative groups often require more evidence for 
validating conclusions to the public and can afford to gather extensive data (Robinson, et al. 
2011). There is a misconception that science supporting policy choices is objective (Fischer 2005; 
Sarewitz 2004). Science can be biased or selectively chosen to support a particular policy 
outcome that is desirable to the government. Sarewitz (2004) also pointed to technical evidence 
being able to trump anecdotal evidence, which in collaborative processes could result in 
community opinions and observations being set aside in favour of measurable data.  
Government-led collaborative processes often have broader impacts and it can be difficult 
to use local observations to inform larger scale decisions (Robinson, et al. 2011). If the final 
decisions are based solely on government-supported data, other members of the collaborative 
group might have little influence on final decisions (Watson, et al. 2009). Group conflict has 
resulted in collaborative processes that did not prioritize lived experiences and local observations 
(Robinson, et al. 2011). These conflicts can result in hurdles to implementation for the final plan 
created through collaborative group support (Robinson, et al. 2011). This is one situation 
whereby outcomes are not respected: if the government cannot implement the plan, then the 
opinions of members in the collaborative group will not be used to make change on-the-ground. 
Impact is difficult to determine especially for environmental outcomes (Mandarano and 
Paulsen 2011). However, the literature on evaluating collaborative outcomes also emphasizes the 
importance of measuring implementation efforts (Blackstock, et al. 2012; Valve, et al. 2013). 
Implementation and impact measure different variables of success. Implementation determines 
whether decisions were put into effect, whereas measuring impact attempts to understand what 
affects resulted from decisions. Implementation is particularly important in understanding 
whether government includes outcomes from collaborative bodies in final decision-making. 
Many important elements of success that were identified in the literature, such as building social 
capital or increasing knowledge, are less important to stakeholders engaged in the process than 
ensuring effective implementation (Blackstock, et al. 2012). In terms of implementing the 
decisions from collaboration it may be easier to allow one actor to take charge, but this 
encourages other stakeholders to be passive toward the process (Clarke and Fuller 2011). 
Additionally, narrow stakeholder participation limits the ability of the group to confront mutual 
challenges (Richie, et al. 2012).  
2.3  Theme 3: Institutions and Collaborative Processes  
Collaborative approaches continue to gain popularity for informing government decision-making. 
Therefore, it is essential to understand how collaborative processes are understood as formal and 
informal institutions and the degree to which they are changing the roles and responsibilities of 
conventional government. The institutional framework in Canada will help to clarify how 
collaborative processes inform government decision-making (Theme 1). Additionally, 
institutional aspects of collaborative approaches will inform appropriate outcome protection and 
evaluation (Theme 2).  
In Canada, responsibilities for water are split between provincial and federal government as 
outlined in the Canadian Constitution Act. The provinces have greater responsibility in the 
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routine management of water resources and allocate certain responsibilities to local government 
or other resource management organizations (de Loë and Kreutzwiser 2007). The common-law 
doctrine of riparian rights forms the basis of access to water in Ontario. This specifies that people 
living on land with water should be able to access that water, but not hinder others from accessing 
water downstream (Johns and Rasmussen 2008).  
The institutional structure of government in Canada was largely formed in the nineteenth 
century and it has become increasingly strained as contextual conditions change, including the 
social norms for decision-making (Johns and Rasmussen 2008; Ontario Ministry of Finance 
2012). Institutions are “the humanly devised arrangements that guide the way people interact. 
They include the laws, customs, social conventions, regulations and rules that structure our 
behaviour” (Pagan 2009, 20). Good institutional structure involves “clear institutional objectives, 
connectedness between formal and informal institutions, adaptability, appropriateness of scale, 
and compliance capacity” (Pagan 2009, 21).  
In order to alter the institutional structure in Canada to better reflect the present social and 
environment context institutional change is needed. Institutional change occurs when formal 
institutions deviate from informal institutions (Pagan 2009). Institutional change is “a shift in 
rules, monitoring, or enforcement procedures so that different behaviours are encouraged or 
constrained” (Imperial 1999, 460). Institutional change is a slow process partially due to the role 
of social acceptance that is required for new rules in organizing institutions (Pagan 2009). This 
reluctance to change leads to new political practices and norms being difficult to implement 
(Pagan 2009). In order for new institutional practices to have an effect the public must recognize 
and accept the change, new strategies should result and different, better results should be 
produced (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Changes in institutions may not necessarily produce different 
outcomes (Kiser and Ostrom 1982). Furthermore, institutional structures can be highly functional, 
but fail to produce meaningful outcomes, or institutional structures can be dysfunctional and still 
provide meaningful outcomes (Ananda, et al. 2009).  
Facilitating better opportunities for public input, especially through collaborative processes, 
is one institutional change that has slowly been ingrained in Canadian water governance. The 
degree of change that collaborative approaches to decision-making could potentially create in 
government decisions is debated in the literature. The potential role that collaborative approaches 
could play in shaping decision-making range between institutional transformation and merely a 
different consultation method that reinforces government control (Newell, et al. 2012; Watson, et 
al. 2009). In Canada, it is the general belief that the state will maintain a dominant role in central 
decision-making although the number of actors involved in decision-making will and has 
increased (de Loë and Kreutzwiser 2007). There is little disagreement that collaboration is 
increasingly being used as a method to inform government decision-making. Thus, determining 
the best balance between collaborative and government approaches is the present challenge 
(Heinmiller, et al. 2008).  
Effective institutional design plays a key role in determining the success of watershed-based 
management (Imperial 1999) and collaborative processes (Ananda and Proctor 2013). For 
collaborative approaches to decision making “(i)nstitutional design refers … to the basic 
protocols and ground rules for collaboration, which are critical for the procedural legitimacy of 
the collaborative process” (Ansell and Gash 2007, 555). Successful collaborative processes 
require clear goals, effective policy integration, and collective understanding of how the 
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collaborative body fits into the decision-making structure (Holman 2013). These criteria mirror 
the criteria for effective institutions outlined above. In order to accomplish objectives, the design 
of collaborative approaches requires a balance between vertical (federal or provincial) and 
horizontal (local) control (Imperial 1999). 
The benefits and challenges of shifting to institutional structures that prioritize collaborative 
approaches need to be considered. One consideration is ensuring that decision-makers are 
accountable. Decision-making and implementation responsibilities are increasingly being carried 
out by local governments or non-governmental bodies (de Loë and Kreutzwiser 2007). In the UK 
(Watson, et al. 2009) and Australia (Australian Public Service Commission 2009) this localized 
responsibility has resulted in reduced government accountability. “Accountability refers to 
answerability to someone for appropriate conduct and expected performance … [and] refers to 
the processes by which actors provide reasons for their actions against the backdrop of possible 
… consequences” (Schillemans 2008, 177). Collaborative processes produce ‘horizontal’ 
accountability among peers that have equal standing as opposed to traditional ‘vertical’ 
accountability, which is gained through the hierarchy of central government and agencies 
(Schillemans 2008). In action-level collaborative processes accountability can be achieved 
through “self-enforcement and community norms” (Robinson, et al. 2011, 855). Government 
initiated collaborative bodies rely on traditional forms of accountability founded on government 
responsibility (Robinson, et al. 2011). This underscores the difficulty of governments 
implementing collaborative outcomes because the government must be accountable to the general 
public. The accountability and performance management mechanisms for conventional forms of 
government decision-making do not adequately represent new more deliberative forms of 
decision-making (Australian Public Service Commission 2009; Schillemans 2008).  
Balancing conventional government tools and roles with relatively new participatory 
mechanisms is difficult because the managerial responsibilities and accountability of government 
to the public has been ingrained over time (Heinmiller, et al. 2008). Determining an appropriate 
scale to address challenges is one step to distribute the responsibility of government (Marshall 
2008). Ananda et al. (2009) discuss that complex issues should be handled at higher 
administrative levels. However, this can be counterproductive to practice. A common practice in 
environmental management is downloading responsibilities to the lowest administrative level able 
to perform the task given their capacity, which is known as subsidiarity (Head 2008; Marshall 
2008). Challenges remain for determining appropriate scales for various issues (Marshall 2008). 
For effective use of collaborative bodies in government institutions, governments must consider 
how collaboration enhances policy goals and benefits the public interest (Meadowcroft 2007). 
2.4 Theme 4: The IAD Framework  
There are many available frameworks for understanding collaborative processes. Determining a 
suitable framework that addresses the research question and case study context is helpful for 
structuring research and determining findings. However, as Imperial (1999) notes “there is no 
consensus on definitions, concepts, or the methodological approach to studying the structure of 
interorganizational networks” (453). The lack of a clear methodological approach has led to the 
creation of multiple frameworks for investigating different aspects of collaborative processes. The 
IAD framework has been a helpful tool in understanding collaborative processes (Imperial 1999; 
Imperial and Yandle 2005) and will be used in this research. The IAD framework is best suited to 
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answer the research questions and represent the context of LWR in Ontario, but other frameworks 
were available including the two outlined below.  
The governance principles discussed by Lockwood et al. (2009; 2010) could have been 
used to frame this research by comparing traits of good governance to the experiences of LWR in 
Ontario. Traits included elements like legitimacy, transparency, integration, fairness, etc. These 
indicators did not overview how government decision-making integrates input from collaborative 
groups, but rather focused on different levels of government decision-making. These criteria 
attempted to understand good governance practices. This is essential to government decisions that 
incorporate collaborative input, but is not the focus of this research.  
The advocacy coalition framework was also a potential framework for this research. It 
centers on policy making and how actors with shared normative beliefs can work together to 
accomplish policy goals (Sabatier, et al. 2005). The advocacy coalition framework focuses 
locally to incorporate specific contextual elements and prioritizes the values of individuals. The 
advocacy coalition framework was not selected for this research because individual water users 
are more likely to act based on their needs than on a sense of shared values with other WRT 
members. 
The IAD framework can be used to better understand the relationship between government 
and multi-actor groups and how outcomes are implemented. The IAD framework was created in 
the early 1980s by Kiser and Ostrom (1982) and has been refined and modified over the last 30 
years (Ostrom 2005; Ostrom 2011). The framework is metatheoretical; it offers a number of 
propositions for assessment as opposed to investigating a single attribute of institutions, such as 
whether there is a positive impact from an institution. This allows a number of different types of 
institutions to be evaluated through the framework without biasing a particular arrangement. The 
IAD framework has two main components. First, it discusses the factors that influence decision-
making and how outcomes impact these factors. Second, it highlights different political scales 
where decision-making occurs from the local management scale to the constitutional scale. 
The first component of the IAD framework is composed of context, an action arena, 
patterns of interaction, outcomes and evaluation (Figure 2.3). Contextual variables include 
biophysical, social and institutional characteristics of the case study. Contextual characteristics 
impact the types of institutional design and outcomes that are appropriate (Imperial 1999; Ostrom 
2005). They further influence how decisions are made by actors in the action arena and determine 
whether solutions will be an adequate fit for the contextual setting (Ostrom 2011).  
14 
 
Figure 2.3: IAD Framework   
 
                                                                          Adapted from (Ostrom 2011) 
The action arena is delineated by rules that explain how decisions are made. The rules at 
this level determine the actors who can be involved, roles that different actors can perform, 
information that is available and the types of actions that are available (Ostrom 2011). See Table 
2.1 for a list of rules. A rule is a “prescription that forbids, permits, or requires some action or 
outcome and the sanctions associated with failing to follow a rule” (Imperial 1999, 453, Table 1). 
Rules help to explain the choices that are made in decision-making and outcomes derived from 
those choices (Ostrom 2005). Altering rules results in actors using new strategies or behaviours, 
which can lead to different outcomes (Imperial 1999).  
Table 2.1: Rules That Define the Action Arena  
Rules Definition 
Position Set of positions in participatory processes and how many participants hold each 
position. 
Scope Set of outcomes that may be affected and the external inducements and/or costs 
assigned to each of these outcomes. 
Authority Set of actions assigned to a position (i.e., the actions each participant is 
authorized to take). 
Information Channels of communication among participants and the language and form in 
which communication will take place. 
Boundary How participants are chosen to hold positions and how participants leave these 
positions. 
Aggregation Decision function(s) to be used at a particular decision points. 
Payoff How benefits and costs are to be distributed to participants in different positions. 
                                                                                                 (Cowie and Borrett 2005, 474) 
The patterns of interaction highlight the relations among actors necessary for achieving 
potential outcomes. The patterns of interaction are dependent on the rules in the action arena. 
“Interactions are influenced by the explicit and implicit assumptions about the rules used to order 
relationships between individuals (or organizations)” (Imperial 1999, 454). The social context of 
the community also influences the pattern of interaction. The community dynamic and history of 
past interactions will dictate how actors form relationships with one another.  
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15 
 
The framework also considers outcomes and various evaluation criteria. Over time the 
outcomes that are produced may influence the contextual variables and the action arena (Imperial 
1999; Ostrom 2005). The outcomes will either fulfill or fall short of objectives. If outcomes do 
not ameliorate challenges, then the action arena may be altered to change decision-making in an 
attempt to improve outcomes. Evaluation criteria are normally used to judge if physical results 
are achieved or if the benefit to cost ratio is acceptable to the public and decision-makers (Ostrom 
2005). There are a number of potential criteria that could be used to evaluate outcomes. Ostrom 
(2005; 2011) tends to highlight criteria that judge political, economic and social variables. 
Criteria that have been used to evaluate outcomes in the IAD framework including economic 
efficiency; equity; adaptability, resilience and robustness; accountability; conformance to general 
morality; and the need for trade-offs (Ostrom 2005).    
The second component of the IAD framework incorporates different ‘levels’ of decision-
making. There are three levels where decision-making occurs: 1) constitutional choice-level, 2) 
collective choice-level and 3) operational choice-level. The constitutional level refers to the 
“constitution governing the legislature” (Ananda, et al. 2009, 309). It refers to who has the 
jurisdiction to take action on an issue. This level impacts outcomes by determining who is eligible 
to participate and how they participate. The collective level represents decisions that “are made 
by officials to determine, enforce, continue, or alter actions authorized within institutional 
arrangements” (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, 208). The operational level represents actions taken in 
the physical world by individuals (Hardy and Koontz 2009). Each level influences the decision-
making structure at the other levels. The IAD framework as depicted in Figure 2.2 is present at 
each level. The outcomes of the constitutional and collective levels are often rules that determine 
decision-making in subsequent levels.  
2.4.1 Evolution of the IAD Framework  
The IAD framework is beneficial for understanding how institutional arrangements affect 
environmental management processes and outcomes (Imperial and Yandle 2005; Koontz 2005). 
Political economy was the field where the IAD framework was created and it has been borrowed 
by collaborative environmental scholars (Ostrom 2005). “Understanding the complex set of 
transformation that link institutional arrangements to individual behaviour and aggregate results 
occurring in the ‘real’ world” was the original purpose of the framework (Kiser and Ostrom 1982, 
180). The IAD framework is continually evolving to suit institutional designs and emerging 
challenges.  
Scholars in environmental management (Ananda and Proctor 2013; Imperial and Yandle 
2005) and collaborative governance (Ananda and Proctor 2013; Gerlak and Heikkila 2006; 
Koontz 2005) have borrowed the IAD framework to better understand institutional arrangement 
and performance. Mark Imperial (1999) revealed the merit of using the IAD framework to 
understand collaborative processes in institutional settings (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). He found 
the IAD framework is helpful for analyzing environmental management institutions because it: 
 Includes a spectrum of transaction costs associated with policy implementation; 
 Considers contextual settings; and  
 Does not favour one type of institutional arrangement over another (Imperial 1999).  
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This last point is essential for comparing different types of environmental management 
institutions, such as community development, collaborative processes and conventional 
government hierarchical arrangements. This comparison is made possible by the focus on rule-
structured interactions (Imperial 1999).   
The framework has been adapted to study collaborative environmental management and 
governance institutions. There have been three major adaptions. First, the constitutional level is 
not defined strictly as the constitutional laws of a state, but rather as the policy that enables the 
collaborative process and its objectives (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). A definition for the 
constitutional level incorporates governance aspects, institutional arrangement and sets the rules 
for decision-making at the collective choice level. The constitutional level of analysis for 
collaborative processes can also reflect diverse arrangements from regional governance to inter-
state actors, instead of only the highest level of government (Cowie and Borrett 2005). Second, 
the collective level in government-led collaborative arrangements establishes management plans 
and policy making through collaborative processes. At this level participants deliberate and 
determine outcomes to be implemented at the operational level. Third, the actors in the 
operational level are often characterized as resource users as opposed to individuals. It is also the 
level where final outcomes are implemented and monitored (Gerlak and Heikkila 2006). 
Authors who use the IAD framework to understand environmental management and 
collaborative processes tend to focus on one or a few elements of the framework (Cowie and 
Borrett 2005; Gerlak and Heikkila 2006; Imperial and Yandle 2005; Koontz 2005). The main 
analysis occurs between levels (constitutional, collective and operation) of collaborative decision-
making (Cowie and Borrett 2005; Gerlak and Heikkila 2006) or focuses on one level to determine 
key attributes, structures and processes of decision-making or implementation (Imperial and 
Yandle 2005; Koontz 2005). Furthermore, relevant rules can be selected as the focus of analysis 
while others can be ignored if they are not relevant (Ostrom 2005).  
2.5 Conceptual Framework 
The IAD framework provided the general structure for the conceptual framework depicted in 
Figure 2.4. The three levels of analysis (Provincial, Watershed and Individual) mirror the typical 
levels that are impacted in government-led collaborative approaches for environmental decision-
making in Canada. The action arena, patterns of interaction and outcomes are also directly from 
the IAD Framework. As discussed in Theme 2 taking into consideration multiple types of 
outcomes is important for collaborative approaches. Implementation represents the tangible based 
indicators for determining if outcomes are protected by government. Investigating actor 
involvement in the collaborative process will underscore whether opinions other than government 
informed the collaborative outcomes. Stakeholder satisfaction outlines the social element of 
evaluation and whether participants thought the collaborative process was worthwhile and 
resulted in beneficial outcomes for their communities of practice. 
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Figure 2.4: Conceptual Framework  
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3 Chapter 3 
 
Methods 
This chapter outlines the research methodology and the methods used for collecting and 
analyzing data. First, the qualitative, multi-case study research approach is discussed. This 
includes the rationale for using a case study approach and the selection criteria for determining 
appropriate case study locations. Subsequently, an overview of the research design is presented, 
including data collection methods and data sources. Finally, this section includes an outline of the 
data analysis procedures, which were structured by the conceptual framework to support findings.   
3.1 Research Approach  
A qualitative approach to gathering data was used in this research. Qualitative analysis is useful 
for understanding interviewees’ views on issues, while still accounting for researcher bias and 
allowing for attentiveness to interviewee perspectives – something that is essential for truthful 
findings (Bazeley 2013). The key instrument for qualitative data analysis is the researcher herself. 
This requires open mindedness to unanticipated findings and being cautious of conclusions early 
in the process (Bazeley 2013).  
The dependence on the researcher in qualitative studies has roused suspicions as to the 
rigour involved and the ability to replicate findings. However, qualitative methods provide the 
foundation for exploring ‘real world’ issues outside of the laboratory, including issues that cannot 
be controlled and that are intertwined with human behaviour, prior experiences, and perceived 
constructs (Gray 2004). Qualitative data are well grounded, capable of illuminating cause and 
effect, and well-suited for representing temporal and spatial characteristics (Bazeley 2013). These 
beneficial attributes provide strong support for the use of case study method to investigate LWR 
in Ontario. 
A case study is “an empirical inquiry about a contemporary phenomenon (e.g., a “case”), 
set within its real-world context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009, 18). Case studies are effective for explanatory and 
descriptive research (Yin 2012). Descriptive research explores ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Miles, 
et al. 2014). This research is largely descriptive because it investigates how decisions from WRTs 
are incorporated into government decision-making and why outcomes are or are not protected by 
government in collaborative initiatives.  
Multi-case study approaches investigate cases that are similar whereas single case studies 
focus on a target case supplemented by information gathered from other contexts (Stake 2006). 
Multiple case studies allow for replication to understand if similar relationships exist in different 
areas and to verify if findings are reliable or dependent on context by comparing and contrasting 
case results (Yin 2009). Observing the local context and connection with actors involved in 
programs provides richer and deeper insight into the case. A multi-case study was used to 
investigate the role of WRTs in LWR because the context in each conservation authority was 
similar biophysically, socially and institutionally. The case study approach contributed to this 
research by validating theoretical work on how collaboratively reached decisions are used by 
government and whether outcomes are protected by governments in collaborative processes.  
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3.2 Case Study Selection   
The LWR program is an example of a collaborative decision-making process because it fits the 
criteria discussed by Ansell and Gash (2007), which were outlined in Chapter 2. The WRTs were 
created through government agencies, are formally organized and meet collectively. The WRTs 
are included in local decision-making for LWR and are composed of multiple types of actors 
including non-state actors, such as agricultural or aggregate representatives. The focus of the 
WRTs is managing water resources and the LWR program prioritizes consensus decision-making.  
Ontario LWR was selected as a research topic over other collaborative processes in Ontario 
because it fulfilled the following criteria: 
 A government-led collaborative initiative as defined by the Center for Watershed Protection 
(1998). Selecting a government-led initiative is necessary for understanding whether the 
government is protecting outcomes from collaborative processes they initiate. 
 A collaborative process that has completed the expected outcomes for government.  
 A collaborative approach that has been established for at least ten years to understand how 
over time the relationship between government and the collaborative body has formed and 
whether outcomes have been protected.   
The criteria for determining the case studies within LWR are discussed in the next section. 
3.3 LWR Case Studies’ Locations 
A multi-case study approach was used to collect data from LWR in Ontario. Case studies should 
be relevant to the research question, represent diversity in context and provide the ability to 
investigate complexity and context (Stake 2006). Cases in this research were spatially bound by 
conservation authority boundaries (see Figure 3.1) and temporally bound from 2001 (the release 
of the first LWR program document) to the present. Conclusions from cases reflect how WRT 
decisions were incorporated into government decision-making and whether the outcomes from 
LWR were respected. Three case study areas representing WRTs were selected to represent 
collaborative approaches to decision-making for LWR through a descriptive, multi-case study 
approach.  
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Figure 3.1: Conservation Authority Boundaries and Case Study Locations 
 
 
Case study locations were selected based on whether the watershed had experienced 
conditions that warranted a Level 3 designation. A preliminary scan of press releases in each 
conservation authority and Conservation Ontario data revealed ten WRTs that had experienced 
Level 3 conditions in their watershed. Case studies were prioritized based on being located in 
southern Ontario, special status in the LWR program, such as a pilot project happening within the 
watershed, and diverse spatial and water-use characteristics. The rationale for case study selection 
is presented in Table 3.1. A detailed overview of the biophysical, social and institutional factors 
for each case study is presented in Chapter 4, Section 3. The focus for this case study was 
southern Ontario. Watersheds within eastern and northern Ontario face different challenges than 
southern Ontario and have different water use characteristics. The MOE has five regional offices 
to coordinate local programs. The boundaries of the West Central Region and Southwestern 
Regions provided the boundaries for case study locations capturing the experiences in Southern 
Ontario.  
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Table 3.1: Characterization of Case Studies 
Case Study Water Use and Projects 
Catfish Creek 
Watershed 
 Southwestern Region.  
 Most land use is agriculture based. 
 Area where tobacco is grown, which is a water intensive crop. 
 Large number of irrigation ponds present in watershed. 
 Faced Level 3 indicators in 2007, but did not recommend declaring 
Level 3. 
Nottawasaga 
Valley 
Watershed 
 Southwestern Region. 
 Agriculture dominates land use.  
 Active aggregate industry.  
 Pilot project site for Level 3 funded by Ministry of Natural 
Resources (MNR).  
 Faced Level 3 indicators in 2007 and recommended declaring 
Level 3.  
Grand River 
Watershed  
 West Central Region.  
 Crop irrigation is high in the southern end of watershed. 
 Aggregate dewatering, golf courses, aquaculture and water bottling 
dominate commercial use.  
 Pilot project site for Level 3 funded by MNR. 
 Faced Level 3 indicators in 2007 and 2012, but only recommended 
declaring Level 3 in 2007.  
 
3.4 Data Collection   
Data triangulation is important for verifying findings in qualitative studies (Yin 2009). This 
requires multiple data sources to support findings. This research used key informant interviews, 
document analysis and personal observations to collect data. Key informant interviews were 
essential for gathering the opinions of interviewees in LWR to understand whether outcomes are 
protected and if participants are satisfied with their engagement. Document review provided 
contextual information and the structure of LWR as detailed in policy frameworks and legal 
documents. Meeting minutes and press releases further highlighted the experiences in and 
outcomes from LWR. Finally, personal observations were used to cross-check findings from 
document analysis and interviews. 
3.4.1 Document analysis  
In total, 72 documents were coded. Documents released by provincial government departments, 
municipalities, non-government organizations and conservation authorities were included for 
assessment. Conservation authority websites and provincial agency websites were scrutinized for 
applicable documents. The policies that informed LWR, including the Ontario Water Resources 
Act and its regulations, LWR policy documents, PTTW guiding documents and educational 
materials (21) were foundational documents for analysis. Municipal bylaws and other relevant 
materials (4) were used to understand the actions of municipalities. Documents by non-
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governmental organizations (3) operating at the provincial level provided critiques of the LWR 
program. Conservation authority documents (15) outlined operational procedures and 
conservation authorities’ perspectives of the LWR program. Conservation authority 
correspondence (4) to LWR partners was also included for analysis. Meeting minutes (16) from 
WRTs provided an overview of the structure of meetings, how participants contributed and what 
was discussed. Newspapers and other media sources were investigated using key search terms, 
such as Ontario Low Water Response, Level 3, etc. Media sources (9) provided a source for 
assessing implementation and reported on some of the challenges of declaring Level 3. Finally, 
interviewees were asked during interviews if they were aware of any documents that would 
benefit the research and those were added for analysis.  
3.4.2 Interviews 
Interviews allow people to explain their experiences and perspectives and allow the researcher to 
consider new questions as themes and ideas emerge from interviews (Van den Hoonaard 2012). 
Questions were derived from the conceptual framework to understand the relationships between 
different actors and whether participants were satisfied by outcomes, implementation and their 
role in the process. The rules from the action arena in the IAD framework helped to shape 
questions that investigated how decisions were made and how outcomes from the WRTs were 
incorporated into government decision-making. Evaluation criteria for outcome protection were 
determined by asking interviewees about their experiences with LWR and implementation, 
inclusion in decision-making, and satisfaction with outcomes. See Appendix 1 for a list of 
interview questions.  
Interviews were arranged in each WRT with interviewees who represented different sectors. 
This provided a varied perspective on the relationships that form between government and the 
collaborative body and different views on whether the government is protecting outcomes. 
Government officials from the MOE (2), MNR (1), and Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
(OMAF) (2) also were interviewed to understand the provincial government view, perspectives 
on the collaborative process undertaken by WRTs, and reasons why Level 3 has not been 
declared. Provincial government participants are often members of multiple WRTs. Therefore, 
the people interviewed were not treated as members of each individual case study. An interview 
was also arranged with a non-governmental organization at the provincial scale to understand a 
broader perspective of LWR that is not connected to government decision-making. Local 
conservation authority staff (5) were interviewed to understand how WRTs are formed and how 
members interact. Municipal officials (4) were interviewed to understand local government’s role 
in WRTs. All together 22 people were interviewed out of 37 who were contact to take part in this 
research; see Table 3.2 for how interviewees were divided among case studies. 
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Table 3.2: Interviewees by Case Study  
Case Study  Interviewee 
Catfish Creek watershed 5 
Nottawasaga Valley watershed 6 
Grand River watershed   5 
Provincial Government or non-government  6 
Total 22 
 
Clearance from the University of Waterloo Research Ethics Board was obtained prior to 
interviews. The conservation authority representative for LWR in case study locations was 
contacted to inform them about the project and benefits and risks of being included in the 
research. E-mail addresses for the WRT members were gathered from the internet or supplied by 
conservation authority staff; in some cases conservation authority staff facilitated access to WRT 
members. Additionally, a snowball method was used for gathering interview candidates by asking 
for additional contacts from interviewees. Potential interview candidates received an e-mail 
outlining the research, ethics clearance and their participation. In-person interviews (16) or 
telephone interviews (6) were arranged that lasted twenty minutes to two hours. There were 12 
individual interviews, two interviews with a pair of interviewees, and two interviews where three 
people were interviewed together. The interviews were audio recorded with the permission of the 
interviewees and transcribed. One interviewee declined to have the interview audio recorded. 
Transcriptions were returned to the interviewees for verification of their accuracy, to clarify any 
points that were made, and to add information that was not discussed during the interview.  
3.4.3 Personal observation  
Personal observations are based on recording experiences through what was sensed, heard and 
seen while conducting research, and then weaving a narrative based on the observations (Yin 
2012). An obstacle to observational methods is gaining access to the research setting (Gray 
2004). As recommended by Gray (2004) it is helpful to find a ‘gatekeeper’ who can assist the 
researcher to access the research setting. In this case it was helpful to build on relationships that 
were garnered between LWR committees and my advisor and his past students as well as 
colleagues who work in LWR.   
To gather personal observations I visited locations of importance for LWR and noted 
observations during interviews. Observations took place between September 2013 and March 
2014. Notes included the date, location, those in attendance and the contextual characteristics of 
observations. Observations took place while on an irrigation tour officially organized by the 
NVCA, an impromptu tour of water users’ irrigation systems in Catfish Creek watershed, a tour 
of the MNR Surface Water Monitoring Centre in Peterborough, and during a workshop organized 
by Farm and Food Care Ontario about water conservation projects. It was my intention to attend 
WRT meetings to observe the relational dynamics among actors at meetings first hand, but data 
collection occurred during summer 2013 to spring 2014, a wet year for most of Ontario. As a 
result, no LWR meetings took place during the study period. However, interviewees discussed the 
atmosphere in meeting from 2012 – a dry summer, which supplemented not being able to attend 
meetings firsthand.  
24 
 
3.5 Data Analysis  
How government uses the outcomes from collaborative approaches to decision-making and the 
extent governments are protecting collaborative outcomes were addressed by this research. 
Studying the relationship between government and collaborative processes simultaneously with 
the mechanisms for protecting outcomes is essential. This approach helped to solidify the 
connections between process, outcome and evaluation, which provided richer analysis into the 
case of LWR. The conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.4) was used to structure 
data analysis.  
To apply the conceptual framework to LWR the biophysical, social and institutional context 
was determined for each case study. The action area is composed of the actors involved in 
decision-making and the rules that govern their choices and behaviour. Actors who are involved 
in LWR include provincial government, conservation authority staff, municipal government, local 
water users and special interests, such as recreation. For the purposes of this study the three levels 
of analysis Provincial, Watershed and Individual (Constitutional, Collective and Operational, 
respectively) provided the major focus as they reflect the LWR context. 
The types of measures typically used for evaluation in the IAD framework, such as 
economic efficiency, equity and adaptability would not answer the questions this research is 
asking. These are necessary measures to understand if decisions were effective, but the challenge 
is that collaborative outcomes are not used for final decision-making. If decision are not used it is 
impossible to assess if inputs would have been effective. Therefore, focusing on indicators for 
understanding if government protects outcomes is essential. Implementation will be a key 
indicator to understand the government’s final decision and whether it included input from the 
collaborative group.  
This research mirrors the work of Gerlak and Heikkila (2006) in using implementation as a 
key indicator to evaluate the outcomes for collaborative arrangements. Participant engagement 
and satisfaction were also used as indicators for assessing if stakeholders felt that their opinions 
were incorporated into decision-making and if they felt the outcomes were valuable. These two 
indicators attempt to understand whether actors’ opinions are incorporated into collaborative 
outcomes and if outcomes are producing benefits in actors’ communities of practice. As outlined 
in the conceptual framework, investigating these three indicators will provide insight into the 
social, process and impact outcomes.   
The early stages of analysis began with transcribing interviews, typing up personal 
observations and field notes, and collecting documents. Throughout this process and during 
analysis the use of personal memos for exploring preliminary ideas was an essential step. Memos 
help the researcher understand concepts, link data to theoretical concepts, track thinking over 
time and helps findings materialize (Van den Hoonaard 2012). Notes during the data collection 
and analysis processes were recorded in a Word document and catalogued by date. The memos 
consisted of primary data I was reviewing, sources from the broad literature that might discuss 
similar themes and emerging ideas. 
 Organizing the different sources of data was the next step in analysis. NVivo 10 software 
was used to collect data in one location, group similar themes through codes, explore 
relationships and support findings. NVivo is a qualitative data analysis tool that assists 
researchers by creating viable and replicable results, query data and visualize findings. Using 
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software, such as NVivo, for analysis increases the potential of limiting the scope and reducing 
flexibility in analysis (Van den Hoonaard 2012). However, ensuring that new codes can be 
created to capture emerging themes is one way to ensure broad scope and flexibility; another way 
is to revisit coded material for accuracy and relevance. 
Two cycles of coding were undertaken to ensure material was properly represented. The 
first coding process used Structural Coding Method to group data into themes. Structural coding 
“applies a content-based or conceptual phase representing a topic of inquiry to a segment of data 
that relates to a specific research question” (Saldaña 2009, 66). The conceptual framework guided 
the creation of codes. A ‘grandparent’ code separated the Provincial, Watershed and Individual 
levels. ‘Parent’ codes under each level were used for action arena, Patterns of Interaction, 
Outcomes, and Outcome Protection Evaluation. A ‘child’ node was used to represent each of the 
rules in the action arena code. As previously discussed it is essential to ensure that emerging and 
unexpected themes are included. Therefore, as coding took place new parent and child nodes 
were created. To separate material pertaining to case study locations, documents, observations 
and interview transcripts had a source code applied that tracked what case study (Catfish Creek, 
Nottawasaga Valley or Grand River) the data corresponded to. This made it possible to 
understand case material and compare data between cases.  
The second cycle of coding was used for fact checking and refining emerging codes. The 
material in each code was reviewed to assess whether it fit the description in the code book – a 
document outlining the definition of each code, what was included or excluded and examples. If 
material reflected the description of the code it remained coded, but otherwise it was removed. If 
the data appeared important, but still did not fit in the code, a new code was created or it was 
moved to another more suitable code. For codes that held a large amount of information the 
material was reviewed to understand if themes existed. If there were groupings of different 
themes child nodes were created. For example the code ‘challenges’ had ‘administrative’ and 
‘physical’ child codes created after reviewing the code.  
Evaluating the data was the final stage of analysis. This case study design is predominantly 
descriptive, which largely does not use ranking or sliding scales to qualify results (Miles, et al. 
2014). Comparing case studies’ experiences provided the basis for analysis. The experiences of 
each case study at the watershed and individual levels were reported as well as how outcomes 
were protected through implementation and participant inclusion and satisfaction. The provincial 
level was not separated into case studies because findings were similar for each case study and 
provincial participants were present on more than one WRT making it difficult to attribute their 
perspectives to one WRTs experience. Matrix coding was used to compare the information in 
codes between case studies and to understand if there were differences of opinion within case 
studies. Matrix coding uses a table to list data that has been assigned two codes; in this case one 
code related to the case study watershed. A descriptive comparison of the official LRW program 
and participants’ experiences was used to understand how government incorporates collaborative 
outcomes into final decisions. Outcome protection was evaluated through implementation and 
participant engagement and satisfaction. Implementation reported on the specific steps necessary 
to designate Level 3, including documentation of water conservation; evidence of social, 
economic and environmental impact; and developing a prioritization of use. The views that 
emerged in the data were collected, synthesized and reported. The degree outcomes are protected 
by government were assessed for each case study by addressing similarities and differences in 
opinion concerning whether outcomes were protected.  
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4 Chapter 4 
 
Contextual Setting  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the LWR program and uses the IAD framework to 
characterize the decision-making process. The PTTW program in Ontario is also outlined, 
including how it contributes to LWR. I then characterize the contextual setting of Catfish Creek 
watershed, Nottawasaga Valley watershed and Grand River watershed. The factors discussed 
include biophysical, social and institutional factors for each case study.  
4.1 Low Water Response Program  
The term ‘drought’ is used in multiple contexts with varying definitions. Using contextual 
definitions is helpful because the indicators of drought vary by individual, spatially and 
temporally (Passioura 2007). In general drought is less than average rainfall over a long period of 
time. Drought is defined by the LWR program as:  
(w)eather and low water conditions characterized by … below normal precipitation 
for an extended period of time … streamflows are at the minimum required to sustain 
aquatic life while meeting only high priority demands for water … (and/or) 
socioeconomic effects occurring on individual properties and extending to larger areas 
of a watershed or beyond (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010, 6).  
Drought can be disastrous for economic sectors that depend on a steady supply of quality 
water, and can negatively impact the health and wellbeing of communities facing the 
consequences of drought conditions. Prolonged drought or low water conditions can also 
adversely impact the ecological functioning of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. Historical 
instances of dry weather in Ontario that led to low water conditions or drought occurred 
approximately every ten to fifteen years (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010). 
However, with increasing rates of water use and the impacts of climate change on low water 
conditions, droughts are expected to become more frequent and severe (Ontario Ministry of 
Natural Resources, et al. 2010). In the late 1990s, Ontario experienced intensive low water 
conditions. In 2001, a provincial review of this low water episode led to the creation of the 
Ontario Low Water Response plan to ensure provincial support and preparedness during extended 
low water conditions (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010).  
Existing legislation, data collection networks and relationships among provincial 
government, local government and conservation authorities are used to deliver the LWR program. 
The purpose of LWR is to ameliorate the impact of low water conditions, but it does not address 
emergency management or long term planning. WRTs, based on conservation authority 
boundaries, respond to current water situations rather than long-term projections, which remain 
the responsibility of designated agencies. WRTs consist of local water users representing a 
diversity of sectors that take water, municipal government, conservation authorities and 
provincial government representatives from MOE, MNR, OMAF and other departments 
depending on local contextual characteristics. Conservation authority staff act as one of the co-
chairs on the WRT. Provincial representatives fulfill an advisory role and are non-voting. WRT 
members share observations and data, communicate WRT decisions with their sector and 
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implement drought management tools (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010). 
WRTs are responsible for declaring Level 1 and 2, reacting to short-term low water conditions, 
and coordinating a local response.   
The MNR is designated the lead agency for Low Water and Drought Management under the 
Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act. MNR funds LWR and is responsible for 
altering the program as required. LWR mechanisms are triggered when low water conditions are 
present. Low water conditions are designated through thresholds for precipitation and stream flow 
(Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010). MNR collects and analyzes stream flow and 
precipitation data and works with conservation authorities to determine low water conditions in 
local areas.  
There are three classes of water taking specified in the LWR program: essential, important 
and non-essential. These classifications allow for a prioritization of use during periods of low 
water or drought. Essential uses include personal household use (such as water for drinking and 
sanitation), firefighting and water for livestock. These uses of water must be guaranteed access to 
supply in order to maintain quality of life and to reduce the impacts of low water. Important uses 
encompass social and economic uses of water. This category contains the industrial, commercial 
and agricultural uses that contribute to economic growth and social wellbeing. Determining 
priorities for use is the most difficult in this category. Non-essential uses can refrain from using 
water for short time periods with little detrimental effect. This category includes aesthetic or 
luxury usages (household conservation, car washing, lawn watering, etc.). There are usually 
municipal bylaws that oversee these uses.  
There are three levels of LWR (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010):  
 Level 1 is declared if precipitation is less than 80% of the three or eighteen month averages 
or if monthly spring stream flow is below the lowest average summer measurement for that 
monitoring station. A Level 1 declaration initiates voluntary water reduction by 10%.  
 A Level 2 can only occur if a Level 1 has already been designated for that area. Level 2 is 
triggered when the average precipitation is less than 60% of the one, three or eighteen 
month averages, if precipitation is less than 7.6 mm of rain a week or if monthly spring or 
summer flow is between 50-70% of the average. A Level 2 designation initiates voluntary 
water conservation of 20% and restrictions can occur for non-essential uses. Restrictions 
occur through municipal bylaws enforcement, which can be initiated during any level of 
concern.  
 A Level 3 can only be designated once a Level 2 has been confirmed. Level 3 continues to 
use conservation and restriction to reduce the pace of water taking, but it also uses 
regulation through the PTTW to restrict water taking following the recommendations of the 
WRT. A Level 3 can be called when one, three or eighteen month average precipitation 
levels have fallen below 40% of the average or if steam flow is less than 50% of average 
monthly flow. In addition, in order for a Level 3 to be designated there needs to be:  
o Evidence of conservation in Level 1 and 2;  
o Documentation of socio-economic and ecologically adverse 
impacts from low water conditions; and  
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o A recommendation from the WRT for priorities to restrict water 
taking.  
Once Level 3 is designated, control of LWR reverts to government authority. The OWDC is 
responsible for determining whether a watershed has met the requirements for declaring a Level 
3. The OWDC formed the Low Water Committee to liaise with teams once they have declared a 
Level 2. The Low Water Committee has representation of field and water Directors from MOE, 
MNR, OMAF, and Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing. Once a watershed or 
subwatershed enters Level 2, provincial field directors from the affected watershed also sit on the 
committee. The Low Water Committee is responsible for reviewing the documents submitted in 
support of issuing a Level 3 and advice from provincial field representatives to determine whether 
to designate Level 3.  
A Level 3 designation has never been declared despite evidence that on-the-ground 
conditions met requirements for such a designation, and the fact that water systems have reached 
critical drought conditions (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2012b). If a Level 3 is not 
designated the restrictions suggested by the WRT are not implemented. This circumvents the 
obligations of the MOE to limit water taking during a Level 3 and undermines the LWR program 
by failing to adhere to the rules outlining the conditions for a Level 3 and the associated actions.   
4.2 Permit to Take Water 
Ontario regulations for water taking began in 1961 when the Ontario Water Resources 
Commission Act was amended (Conservation Ontario 2003). The PTTW is regulated through the 
Ontario Water Resources Act and allocates permits for water taking for users who withdraw more 
than 50,000 litres per day (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010). The permitting 
system is supposed to “achieve environmental objectives …minimize water supply and water 
quality interference problems and to provide for the settlement of interference complaints” 
(Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2005, 2). The MOE is responsible for administering the 
PTTW. The number of permits that are allocated to water sources and the permitted withdrawal 
volume of these permits will have implications during low water periods. Conflict may arise if a 
water source can no longer support the allotment of water or if the health of the aquatic 
ecosystem is in question. The PTTW is the mechanism that ensures responsible withdrawal of 
water during normal or more than average water levels. The LWR program is responsible for 
ameliorating detrimental impacts of low water. The LWR program depends on the PTTW process 
as a tool for reducing water use during times of low water.  
Each application that is submitted by a water user for a PTTW is examined on a case-by-
case basis (Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2005). Permits are required for agricultural 
purposes, municipal withdrawals, commercial and industrial processes and recreational uses that 
use more than 50, 000 L/day. Water use for firefighting, watering livestock (when water is not 
stored) and household uses does not require a permit. One of the key considerations that a 
Director contemplates while evaluating a permit application is the need to protect the functions of 
ecosystems and to ensure that other water taking activities are not interfered with by new 
permitted water uses. Low water conditions impinge on the ability of water users to withdraw 
water. Permits have conditions in place for withdrawals in times of low water. Permit holders are 
required to monitor their water taking volumes/day. The Director can refuse to grant a permit, or 
can impose conditions on permits in watersheds that have had a higher frequency of low water 
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events. The Director’s decision can reflect the recommendations of the WRT in the watershed 
(Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2005). 
 When an application for a PTTW is evaluated the Director takes into consideration water 
availability of the source, including present uses and the extent of taking for the source of water, 
sustainable yield and low water; the natural functioning in the surrounding ecosystem, including 
flow, effect on habitat and interactions between surface and groundwater sources; and the reason 
the water is being withdrawn (Ontario Ministry of the Environment 2005). Applications for water 
uses that have a higher risk of causing adverse impacts will go through a more intensive 
evaluation process. High risk permits may be granted for a shorter duration. The length of time 
for which a permit is granted depends on environmental risks involved with the permit. Permits 
are not issued for more than ten years.  
4.3 Contextual setting for case study locations 
The biophysical, social and institutional factors were investigated to understand the contextual 
settings. These three factors are identified in the IAD framework as essential for understanding 
the context where decision-making occurs.  
4.3.1  Biophysical characteristics  
The biophysical characteristics of the three case study location include the traits of the physical 
environment or ecosystem elements that impact water level conditions.  
Table 4.1: Biophysical Characteristics by Case Study 
 Catfish Creek  Nottawasaga Valley Grand River 
Area  490 km
2
  3,146 km
2
  6,800 km
2
 
Watershed 
Characteristics 
 Major tributaries: 
Catfish Creek, Nineteen 
Creek, Bradley’s Creek, 
Silver Creek. 
 3 subwatersheds. 
 Major tributaries: 
Nottawasaga River, 
Innisfil Creek, 
Boyne River, Mad 
River, Pine River, 
Willow Creek.  
 9 subwatersheds. 
 Major Tributaries: 
Conestogo River, 
Nith River, Speed 
River, Eramosa 
River. 
 7 subwatersheds.  
Resource 
Problems 
 Area of intense 
agriculture.  
 Urban development. 
 Wastewater treatment 
plant effluents. 
 Naturally low base-
flow.  
 Increasing 
development and 
projected growth in 
region.  
 Innisfil Creek is an 
area of concern for 
low water 
conditions.  
 Intense agriculture.  
 Rapidly expanding 
urban area. 
 Six areas of special 
attention have been 
identified for 
expected supply 
problems, including 
Whitemans Creek. 
Monitoring 
stations 
 15 monitoring wells 
sponsored by different 
organizations/programs. 
 19 Provincial Water 
Quality Monitoring 
Network sites.   
 There are over 45 
stream flow and 
level gauges.  
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(Lake Erie Source Protection Region Technical Team 2008a; Lake Erie Source Protection Region 
Technical Team 2008b; Nottawasaga Valley Source Protection Area 2014) 
All three areas have areas of intensive agricultural and are predicted to face increased 
development pressure. The number of monitoring sites is linked to the size of the watershed. The 
areas receive similar amounts of precipitation because of their geographic location in the Great 
Lakes eco-region (Lake Erie Source Protection Region Technical Team 2008a). Stream flow 
depends on the system in question and varies within and between watersheds. Catfish Creek and 
Grand River watersheds are two of the four conservation authorities included in the Lake Erie 
Source Water Protection Region and share information and have a close working relationship 
(Lake Erie Source Protection Region Technical Team 2008a). Both watersheds drain directly into 
Lake Erie. The three case studies have similar biophysical conditions on a watershed basis, but 
once the scale is reduced to the sub-watershed level, context may vary especially in high risk 
areas for low water, for example Innisfil Creek in Nottawasaga Valley watershed or Whitemans 
Creek in Grand River watershed.  
4.3.2 Social Characteristics  
The social characteristics that are considered in this study represent attributes of the communities 
in the case study watersheds. Details about water users and the predominant uses of water are an 
area of focus for social characteristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 4.2: Social Characteristics by Case Study 
 Catfish Creek Nottawasaga Valley Grand River 
Population  21,200  181,000  821,000 
Primary 
Water Users 
 Agriculture is the 
largest land use.  
 Corn, soybean and 
grains are the largest 
crops. 
 Irrigation is not 
extensive and is 
mostly used for 
specialty crops. 
 Irrigation is centered 
in the southeast. 
 Agricultural irrigation 
is still the greatest 
permitted user of 
water followed by 
municipal water 
supply. 
 Agriculture is the 
largest land use 
particularly 
hay/pasture and 
row crops. 
 Cattle and chicken 
are common 
livestock in the 
region.  
 79 active aggregate 
operations.  
 Multiple golf 
courses operate in 
the region.  
 Fishery, Municipal, 
dewatering, aggregate 
washing, aquaculture, 
remediation, golf 
courses, agriculture, 
and industry all have 
PTTW. 
 Corn, hay and soybean 
are the largest crops. 
 Irrigation is not 
extensive and is mostly 
used for specialty 
crops.  
 The estimated volume 
of water permits is 162 
million cubic meters. 
Urban/rural 
characteristics  
 Urban centers include 
the Town of Aylmer 
(7,151 in 2011). 
 Predominantly rural.  
 Less than 11% of 
watershed is forested.  
 84% of land is used 
for agricultural.  
 Stable development 
growth forecasted.  
 Urban centers 
include 
Collingwood 
(19,421 in 2011) 
and Wasaga Beach 
(17,537 in 2011). 
 Largely rural.  
 34% of the 
watershed in 
natural vegetative 
cover. 
 
 ¾ of the population 
live in urban centers 
including Kitchener 
(219,153 in 2011), 
Cambridge (126,748 in 
2011), Waterloo 
(98,780 in 2011), 
Guelph (141,097 in 
2011) and Brantford 
(135,501 in 2011). 
 19% rural population.  
 75% of land is used for 
agriculture.  
 Population growth will 
be high in urban cores. 
(Lake Erie Source Protection Region Technical Team 2008a; Lake Erie Source Protection Region 
Technical Team 2008b; Nottawasaga Valley Source Protection Area 2014) 
Grand River and Nottawasaga Valley watersheds are forecasted to face greater development 
pressures. This pressure is already manifesting through demand for agricultural land from 
infringing developments and pressure to sell. Irrigation is localized in each watershed to specific 
productive locations. The Grand River watershed has multiple water use sectors that require 
PTTW and a large number of permits whereas Nottawasaga Valley and Catfish Creek watersheds 
are predominantly agricultural permits and a few golf course permits.  
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4.3.3 Institutional Characteristics  
The institutional factors that are discussed in this section pertain to the government and natural 
resource organizations that operate in support of low water conditions. Municipalities are 
described because they contribute to the funding and capacity of conservation authorities as per 
the Conservation Authorities Act. Resource management authorities that operate in the watershed 
are discussed because they represent additional resource capacity for making informed decisions 
on LWR.  
Table 4.3: Institutional Characteristics by Case Study 
 Catfish Creek Nottawasaga Valley Grand River 
Municipalities  7 municipalities are 
found in CCCA 
boundary. 
 Includes Elgin and 
Oxford counties.  
 10 upper, 14 lower 
municipalities.  
  74% of watershed 
part of Simcoe 
County. 
 38 whole and part, 
upper and lower tier 
Municipalities.  
 2 First Nations. 
Resource 
Management 
Authorities 
 Catfish Creek 
Irrigation Advisory 
Committee.  
 
 Innisfil Creek Water 
Users Association.   
 Whitemans Creek 
Irrigation Advisory 
Committee (now 
defunct)  
(Centre of South Simcoe 2014; Grand River Conservation Authority 2008; Lake Erie Source 
Protection Region Technical Team 2008a; Lake Erie Source Protection Region Technical Team 
2008b; Nottawasaga Valley Source Protection Area 2014) 
Each of the watersheds at one point had a form of farmer-led irrigation advisory committee 
spurred by funding from OMAF in mid-2000. The plan was for funding to initiate the committee, 
which was expected to carry on after funding ran out. The Water Users Association in 
Nottawasaga Valley watershed is still operational. The Grand River had an Irrigation Committee 
around Whitemans Creek, which disbanded. Catfish Creek has an Irrigation Advisory Committee, 
which has recently been reinvigorated after a few years of being non-operational.   
Catfish Creek is the smallest conservation authority and has the smallest number of 
municipalities. It is largely an agricultural water user base. There is a partnership between CCCA 
and GRCA to share resources. Nottawasaga Valley has a more varied water user base than 
Catfish Creek, but not as extensive as Grand River. There are resources to take on special projects 
to confront the challenges of low water. Grand River is the largest watershed with the most 
diverse and largest number of PTTW. However, they also have the capacity and resources to 
better understand the impact of low water and determine strategies for ameliorating impacts. Each 
conservation authority faces unique opportunities and challenges in making decisions for LWR. 
Understanding the differences in biophysical, social and institutional contexts allows for 
understanding whether the experiences of each WRT are comparable and what factors make 
experiences transferable.  
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5 Chapter 5 
 
Results 
Chapter Five reports the research results. These results provide evidence for understanding how 
collaborative approaches are incorporated into government decision-making and whether the 
government is respecting collaboratively-reached outcomes. Results are organized by case study, 
except for results that were reached at the provincial level. Provincial results were separated from 
case studies because documents and most interviews pertained to Ontario in general. Each case 
study section presents data from the watershed and individual scales.  
First, the components of the IAD framework – action arena and patterns of interaction – are 
used to compare the case study experiences for how WRT outcomes are used in government 
decision-making. Second, indicators of the extent government is respecting the outcomes from 
WRTs are discussed. Implementation factors include a focus on the required steps for 
recommending the OWDC declare a Level 3, including documentation of conservation efforts; 
social, environmental and economic impact; and recommendations for prioritization for use. 
Additionally, data on stakeholder inclusion in decision-making and satisfaction in outcomes are 
assessed to understand whether the government is respecting outcomes. The chapter ends with a 
cross-case analysis of case study locations.  
5.1 Provincial Level  
The provincial level section overviews (1) how the government makes decisions for LWR, (2) the 
relationships with WRTs and (3) government officials’ perspectives on designating Level 3. This 
section was used to understand the provincial context for each case study. It also represents the 
government opinion of the LWR program and can be compared to the experiences and opinions 
of WRT members.  
5.1.1 IAD Framework 
The provincial analysis of the IAD framework captured who is included in government decision-
making for LWR and how decisions are made. This begins to reveal how government is using the 
input from collaborative decision-making to inform final decisions. See Table 5.1 for findings 
specific to the action arena rules from the provincial scale of analysis followed by a discussion of 
the table.   
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Table 5.1: Results from the IAD Action Arena  
Rule Findings 
Position  Any department that has a stake in managing low water conditions participates 
(largely MNR, MOE, OMAF, but others also play influential roles depending 
on local context).   
Scope  Provincial representatives from each department offer regulatory support to 
WRTs.  
 OWDC is responsible for declaring a Level 3 based on available information.  
Authority  MNR is the lead of the program and financially supports the WRTs.  
 MNR houses the LWR document and maintains a link to all data collected and 
analyzed by the Surface Water Monitoring Centre.  
 MOE ensures compliance with PTTW conditions at all times. 
Information  MNR holds information sessions in spring and debrief sessions in the fall.  
 MOE notifies permit holders of Level 2 conditions.  
 OWDC – Technical Advisory Committee is a steering body that provides 
feedback on the LWR program.  
 There is a good working relationship among provincial departments that is 
maintained through constant communication.  
Boundary   Provincial officials participate based on their position in a government 
department.  
Aggregation  Each government department informs partnering departments of its stance on 
issues and expected actions.  
 Information is communicated from technical and policy staff working on the 
LWR files in each department to the Director who takes concerns and 
information to OWDC. 
Payoff  OWDC - Low Water Committee receives input once any watershed enters a 
Level 2 and is responsible for declaring a Level 3.  
 MOE will impose restrictions to water users if a Level 3 is declared through 
the prioritization of use developed by the WRT. 
 
The actions of the provincial government adhere to their responsibilities outlined in the 
LWR document. The broad role of government is to provide direction and to react to low water 
conditions through building local partnerships (Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food 2013). 
Individuals and the relationships between departments are directed by the management structure 
in departments and the authority each department has under the LWR program. Relations among 
departments are cordial and are strengthened through the history of staff working together. 
Information sessions organized by MNR are an important tool to ensure local participants are 
informed on how the LWR program works and their role in WRTs. Debrief sessions allow the 
MNR to strategically alter the LWR program based on feedback from local partners and their 
experiences. After evaluation of data it remains unclear exactly how the government incorporated 
outcomes from WRTs besides taking their recommendations into ‘consideration’ while deciding 
whether to designate Level 3. 
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5.1.2 Patterns of Interaction  
Provincial interaction patterns highlight governments’ decision-making responsibilities. 
Provincial decision-making is characterized by hierarchical relationships where information flows 
up to higher levels of power and decisions flow down. Provincial staff inform their Directors of 
the situation on-the-ground and supply supporting information. Alternatively, Directors may 
bring issues back to staff for analysis.  
Among departments relationships are cordial, as noted by Respondent 07 who stated “it is 
the responsibility of the Ministries to present themselves as a common government interest. We 
don’t want to be playing each other off … we’re very sensitive to each other’s Ministry”. 
Respondent 17 indicated that Ministries are required to work closely to ensure the program is 
being managed effectively. Respondent 22, while acknowledging that ministries work well 
together also, mentioned the challenge of having many Ministries responsible for aspects of LWR 
while the MNR maintains central control for altering the policy framework. The MNR needs to 
consult with all involved Ministries during policy planning. However, in Respondent 22’s 
opinion, staff in other ministries provide input in an advisory, but limited, role.   
At the watershed level, provincial actors spoke positively of the work being accomplished 
by WRTs. For example, “the WRTs and the ownership that the CAs take for implementing this 
program is amazing. They are just amazing at working together and … really taking ownership of 
the program and implementing it at the local level” (Respondent 17). The synergy in WRTs was 
noted as essential by the same respondent because they “are the foundations of the program, so if 
they are operating well the program has the best chance of being effective”. The local level of 
engagement was deemed as necessary by Respondent 07 because “people are more inclined to 
work with others they know then to be told what to do by strangers”.  
Provincial representatives who participate on WRTs have experienced certain actors or 
sectors not actively engaged in WRTs. One respondent (02) had experienced occasions when 
agriculture had been the only water users present. This resulted in some resentment towards other 
members who should have been present and sharing the work load. The same respondent also had 
been present at meeting where not all provincial departments had been represented at WRT 
meetings. However, Respondent 22 mentioned that it is the aim of lead departments to have 
representatives present at meetings.  
5.1.3 Respecting the Outcomes from Collaborative Processes  
Declaring a Level 3 in LWR can be difficult because judging when a watershed has entered 
emergency conditions is challenging because there are a number of indicators to consider. 
Respondent 17 noted that “there is no solid indicator that says when you get to this point you are 
officially in a Level 3”. This quotation stems from the requirement to present social, economic 
and environmental stresses that low water places on water users and the surrounding 
environment, which are difficult to measure (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2012b). 
Respondent 07 noted that “at Level 3 the plan is premised on the Director using other legal 
mechanisms (e.g., notices and orders) to suspend someone’s water taking on the justification that 
it is necessary … so that other more important or essential water use can be sustained”. The 
respondent continued to discuss that the province ensures that it is cautious not to preemptively 
designate a Level 3 by noting: “It’s that we want to be very careful about introducing regulatory, 
mandatory restrictions on people’s use of water when we are not really sure that it is necessary 
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because people are pretty self-sufficient, they are pretty resilient and up until now we have been 
able to ride it out.” 
5.1.4 Implementation 
In general, provincial-level respondents from all agencies believed that the LWR program 
achieved its purpose. A non-governmental provincial representative highlighted that LWR “is 
more or less a … water resource management tool and it has really forced people to learn how to 
work together to effectively manage a resource”. Multiple WRTs reported to the government that 
Level 1 and 2 are effective. Furthermore, the LWR program has increased awareness of water 
users about the general impacts of low water. Respondent 02 stated that “whereas before people 
might have only seen their own situation now as we get into periods of drought they are more 
aware that this is happening throughout the community and also that their actions can be linked 
and tied to other people and also the natural environment.” However, in a media release the 
Environmental Commissioner of Ontario reported that “the Ontario government is not doing 
enough to protect our water resources against the threat of continued dry spells and drought” 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2012a). 
The MNR reviews the program and gathers input from various people affiliated with LWR 
to determine appropriate program changes. Notes from the debrief sessions held after the 2012 
low water events highlighted the challenges of the reactive nature of the program. Respondents 21 
and 02 noted that the program should be more proactive or have had team members question why 
the plan is not more proactive in planning for future low water conditions. However, Respondents 
07 and 22 both discussed that WRTs and individuals have the opportunity to include proactive 
measures on a local scale. Over the duration of the LWR program it has undergone a number of 
adaptations that respondents considered beneficial (17, 21). The creation of the Technical 
Committee to inform the Low Water Committee under the OWDC was suggested by Respondent 
22 to be a vital sign that improvements to the program are taking place. The decision to have co-
chairs on the WRT, one being a conservation authority member, Respondent 17 felt was 
beneficial for accountability in the program. However, the Environmental Commissioner believes 
that these improvements are not enough to protect the environment and a full review of the 
program is necessary (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2012b).  
Analysis revealed that water users are relatively self-reliant in dealing with low water 
situations. They are adapting low water plans or investing in more efficient machinery, often 
through the assistance of government grants or programs. Conservation authorities are also 
becoming more involved in water management and are able to leverage local knowledge 
(Conservation Ontario 2012). However, key questions were raised by Respondent 22 including: if 
there is a water crisis are there effective water sharing measures that will limit conflict between 
water users? And how will water be shared among sub-sectors in agriculture and between 
municipal and non-municipal supply? This respondent believed that LWR conversations need to 
be expanded to prepare for the future, but it is difficult to create momentum because low water 
and drought are ephemeral policy issues; it is usually only discussed during low water conditions. 
Discussing low water only during crisis management tends to be hectic and does not foster 
meaningful, well thought out changes to policy (Respondent 22). 
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5.1.4.1 Documented conservation and reduction efforts  
The purpose of Level 3 is to impose restrictions because voluntary measures have been 
exhausted. According to the LWR program, the target of Level 3 is to “reduce and manage water 
use demands to the maximum extent” (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010, 24). 
Evidence for supporting a Level 3 designation requires including evidence of water users 
following reductions at Level 1 and 2. The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario has 
identified the requirement to document conservation and water reduction as a difficult 
requirement because the program promotes completely voluntary reductions (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario 2012b). The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario also noted that it 
can take weeks for WRTs to gather the required information for supporting a Level 3 
recommendation. However, as reported in a media release quoting the Environmental 
Commissioner during low water conditions “time is of the essence” ("Environment watchdog 
slams" 2012). The time it takes to prepare a supporting case for a Level 3 might allow serious 
drought impacts to incur without provincial response. The Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario highlighted that this is a particular concern for the next big drought event in Ontario 
(Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2012a).  
At the provincial level there is advocacy for individuals to prepare contingency plans and 
adaptively manage personal water resources by working together. OMAF has created resources 
for water users to be more aware of their personal water situation and plan for the future through 
contingency planning (Myslik 1999; Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and Food 2013). 
Conservation Ontario also has materials that promote reducing demand for water at the watershed 
scale (Conservation Ontario 2003). Respondent 07 also stated “people are reasonably expected to 
be relatively self-reliant, to build your resiliency, diversify your sources, [and] think about the 
long term”.  
5.1.4.2 Documented social, environmental and economic impact 
To support the case for designating a Level 3, evidence of social, environmental and economic 
impacts needs to be presented to the OWDC. Respondent 07 elaborated on the importance of 
ensuring that water users who cannot access water are identified because “we need to know who 
they are because if we were to deliver a package of regulatory controls, we would want to ensure 
it was appropriately targeted”. However, as noted in subsequent sections, water users often will 
alter their watering practices before admitting to impacted water use.  
A challenge that was acknowledged by Respondent 22 is the difficulty of recommending 
the OWDC designate a Level 3 for the first time. It is unknown what information is required and 
the level of detail for proving low water conditions are having an impact. The Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario notes the challenges for gathering information concerning economic 
and social impacts (Environmental Commissioner of Ontario 2012b). The Ontario Federation of 
Agriculture in a 2009 letter about amendments to LWR also highlighted the difficulty in knowing 
what kind of data is required to be included with recommendations.  
5.1.4.3 Recommendations on Prioritization of Use  
One of the concerns discussed in interviews with water users is the requirement for all water users 
to reduce taking, while only a small number of water takers actually withdraw water directly from 
surface water sources. Withdrawals from surface water can have a greater impact on the 
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surrounding environment and fellow water users than irrigation ponds or ground water taking 
(Myslik 1999). Respondent 02 mentioned that “It is a bit hard because it does single out people 
on the one hand, but on the other hand you want to target your message to the people that are 
actually having an impact and being affected”. 
The LWR program document states “decisions on low water and drought response and 
potential water use restrictions are best made with the support and advice of local water managers 
and users” (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, et al. 2010, 18). However, prioritization of 
use was recognized as a difficult task by provincial respondents. Respondent 07 questioned “How 
do you approach that (1000’s of permits) as a community in fairness? How do you start turning 
some of them on and off?” Respondent 08 brought up the challenge of determining appropriate 
roles for the province and local community in determining a fair prioritization of use that clearly 
integrates input from the local scale. 
The PTTW program, the tool that permits water taking over 50,000L/day, is not designed to 
prioritize water allocation, which has been a criticism from the Environmental Commissioner of 
Ontario. The Environmental Commissioner of Ontario recommended in his 2012 report that the 
“PTTW program … include methods to prioritize the allocation of PTTWs and consider the 
cumulative impacts of water taking to better prevent low water conditions” (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario 2012b, 105). However, there was hesitancy from provincial 
respondents in taking on the responsibility of prioritizing water use especially because there is 
disagreement over whether or not low water conditions to date have required intervention. 
Respondent 07 emphasized the dilemma: 
Are we really sure that there is enough of a problem here to warrant any disposition of 
our resources? It gets very challenging … the policy structure around LWR creates an 
unfortunate fog, especially regarding the determination of prioritization of use. If it 
was a recipe approach, this then that, it would happen pretty easily. We are not in the 
position of using a one-size fits all recipe; and I don’t know if we want to be. 
5.1.5 Summary  
According to the results from the provincial scale analysis it appears that the government adheres 
to its responsibilities outlined in the LWR program, but there is the caveat that only provincial 
opinions were included in this section. Government officials reported working well together in 
administering the joint program. However, it can be difficult to make changes to the program 
because another department may hold responsibility and alterations usually happen during low 
water conditions, which can be stressful. Responsibilities are administered through conventional 
government approaches to decision-making that do not fully take into consideration members of 
the collaborative body. The provincial respondents reported that WRTs are an effective medium 
for decision-making and implementation around low water conditions. The focus on the local 
scale is an important aspect of the program because it allows for local conditions to be included in 
decision-making and better implementation because information is spread through peers.  
There have been challenges in WRTs ensuring that all impacted users and required water 
management agencies are at the table and have a voice. Overall, the general belief at WRT 
meetings is that it is worthwhile working collaboratively on low water conditions, although it 
may be stressful at times. The province has been hesitant to interfere in water users’ access to 
water. Water users are believed to be self-sufficient in adapting to low water situations. In the 
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event of a low water crisis there is uncertainty if an appropriate government response could be 
provided, but there is little momentum to tackle program challenges outside of drought 
conditions.  
Environmental watchdogs and concerned organizations at the provincial level have outlined 
challenges of documenting the necessary support for the OWDC to designate Level 3. 
Particularly, voluntary reductions are difficult to document. The slow process of accumulating the 
resources to recommend a Level 3 designation from the OWDC has also been recognized as a 
challenge of the program. One government official highlighted that the first WRTs to proposition 
for a Level 3 have a difficult time in succeeding because the level of detail necessary to support a 
claim is difficult to guess. The provincial government acknowledges that LWR requires revisions 
to ensure that priorities for water use are protected during low water conditions. It is recognized 
that creating a prioritization of use is a difficult and unsavory responsibility, but is necessary in 
times of crisis.  
5.2 Catfish Creek Watershed  
The analysis from the watershed and individual scale are presented through the ‘action arena’ and 
‘patterns of interaction’ codes. The watershed scale provides insight into how decisions are made 
and recommendations provided to the provincial government. The individual scale details how 
water users implement decisions. Analysis of these two scales illuminates how government 
integrates input from the WRT and individuals. The ‘outcome’ and outcome evaluation criteria is 
subsequently reported to provide support for understanding whether the government is respecting 
the outcomes from WRTs. Implementation is reported through a focus on the process of declaring 
a Level 3. This requires the WRT to prepare evidence of voluntary water reduction at Level 1 and 
2; documentation of social, economic and environmental impact; and a prioritization of use. 
Finally, data was outlined regarding whether team members of the WRT felt their opinions were 
incorporated into collaborative decision-making and if they were satisfied by outcomes.  
5.2.1 Watershed  
The IAD framework discusses the structure, decision-making and outcomes of the WRT. The 
outcomes of the WRT are used to inform decision-making at the provincial level and affect the 
actions of water users at the individual scale. See Table 5.2 for data from the action arena rules 
followed by discussion of the table.  
Table 5.2: IAD Action Arena  
Rule Findings 
Position  Predominantly agricultural water users are present on the WRT because 
agriculture dominates water taking permits in the watershed, but there is 
sporadic participation from golf course representatives and aggregate firms.  
 Good representation of various growers and sectors.  
 Some municipalities feel they play a limited role on the WRT.  
Scope  WRT declares Level 1 and 2. 
 WRT recommends declaring Level 3 to OWDC, but must provide supporting 
documents. 
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The responsibility of the WRT and the roles of individual participants largely conform to 
the specifications outlined in the LWR program. There are characteristics of the Catfish Creek 
WRT that are due to the rural nature of the watershed, such as the dominance of agricultural 
water takers on the team and the participation of the tobacco lobby. The strong participation by 
agricultural water takers may sway the priorities for water taking in recommendations to the 
OWDC. Municipal representation also may require a stronger voice or role. Respondent 03 
stated: “In my opinion the municipality has a limited role in that it is more or less the 
Authority  A chair and secretary are elected annually for the team, but provincial 
representatives cannot be selected. 
 Members attend meetings, communicate with their sector, share data, and 
implement decisions.  
 Provincial Government field queries from water users about LWR and play a 
supportive role. 
 CCCA facilitates meetings, declares Level 1, plays a large directing role, 
measures indicators, provides indicator reports, spreads word of level changes, 
and promotes water conservation initiatives.  
 Water users share observations on water levels, levels of irrigation, answer to 
farming practices vs. community perceptions of ‘wasting water’, and give 
input for changing levels.  
Information  Provincial government representative are the intermediary between WRT and 
OWDC.  
 There is constant updating of the team on watershed conditions. 
 Everyone speaks for themselves if present.  
 There are very frank discussions and people speak their mind.  
 Water users inform other people in their sector of watershed conditions. 
 Catfish Creek is a small watershed so people on the team know most producers 
and their irrigation practices.  
 There are a number of medians for getting the message out to people that are 
not on the team. 
Boundary   Water users voluntarily take part, but some are specifically asked due to their 
experience. 
 Tobacco was historically a significant crop and to some extent is still today so 
the tobacco lobby felt that it was imperative to take part in the WRT to 
represent the large number of agricultural producers in the region. 
 Provincial representatives, conservation authorities and municipalities are 
asked to take part in WRT as part of their job duties. 
Aggregation  All members have equal decision-making power (except for provincial 
government who do not vote) and equal opportunity to participate.  
 Meetings are as required and called by the chair.  
 Participants meet in person.  
 Quorum consists of one-third of voting members present at meetings.  
Payoff  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2.  
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[conservation authority] that has the bigger role … as far as my role there isn’t much more than 
having to go to council.”  
Catfish Creek WRT does not use consensus to come to decisions. However, Respondent 01 
expressed that conflict has not arisen from declaring levels and most participants agree to the 
decision. It was significant that provincial government representatives act as the intermediary 
between the WRT and the provincial scale. If there was a more local link between the 
collaborative body and the province different priorities or information might be expressed to the 
OWDC. 
5.2.1.1 Patterns of Interaction 
Members of the Catfish Creek WRT reported good working relations among team members. Also 
during discussion with team members of the WRT individuals seemed to know each other well 
and had a comfortable relationship with one another. Respondent 01 felt that these good relations 
were garnered through increased communication, which improves the conditions of LWR. They 
revealed this sentiment through saying, “I think the really big thing is communication … and 
when I start really paying attention to that communication I feel that we get better results”.   
Team members discussed that precipitation and stream flow can vary locally, which is 
challenging for applying general solutions. It was also suggested that ‘city’ dwelling governments 
are less able to perceive the challenges that are present for rural based regulation, such as 
agriculture. A local WRT can give feedback about the potential impacts and compliance levels 
for provincial regulations, which is captured in the following quotation by Respondent 05:  
Toronto or Ottawa can make rules and regulations and sometimes they have no damn 
idea what they are making them for. Well, they know what they are making them for, 
but they don’t know how it is going to affect people, and certainly by having 
committees there can be conversation and word goes back this will work, this won’t 
work or try it what have you. I think as a liaison between the actual users and the 
people making the regulations … [it] is very important because if you put regulations 
in that you can’t live with everyone is going to break them. 
5.2.2 Individual  
The individual scale underscores the actions of water users affected by low water decisions made 
at the watershed scale. Individuals can also provide feedback to the provincial scale by the actions 
they choose to take or through direct communication. The action arena examines how water users 
reacted to the decisions of the WRT and whether outcomes were implemented and if water users 
were satisfied by outcomes from the WRT. Figure 5.3 outlines the findings from the action arena.  
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Table 5.3: IAD Action Arena  
Rule Findings 
Position  Members on the WRT spread word to their respective sector.  
 MOE informs permit holders of Level 2 conditions.  
Scope  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
Authority  Municipalities implement outdoor water use bylaws. 
 Water users visit fellow farmers to spread voluntary water reduction messages 
during Level 1 and 2 and to inform farmers that they need permits.  
Information  Working on promoting best management practices in agriculture.  
 Dug out ponds are promoted to act as a water supply, but it is expensive to 
install them. 
 Encourage water takers to get permits to take water. 
Boundary   All water takers with permits in the conservation authority boundary are 
expected to participate. 
Aggregation  Participation in water reduction is strictly voluntary. 
Payoff   Water users weigh personal costs of reducing their water use.  
 
Catfish Creek is a small watershed and most water users know each other from living in the 
community. It is easy to communicate the need for water reductions at Level 1 and 2. However, 
given the voluntary nature of LWR it is difficult to know how much water is being reduced. 
Respondent 3 noted that “some people [in the public] are all for it [water reduction] and some 
people scream and yell at us”. Best management practices for conserving water are initiated by 
the water user and whether they are practiced depend on the individual and their motivations for 
conserving water. The voluntary nature of water reductions and whether best management 
practices are used has implications for how water is shared among water users and conserved for 
environmental needs, especially during low water. 
5.2.2.1 Patterns of Interaction  
Prior to the formation of the WRT, farmers described misunderstandings between the public and 
farmers over water use on farms; these are beginning to be resolved since the creation of the 
WRT. The WRT is helping to resolve these issues as highlighted in this quotation by Respondent 
04: “that is probably the biggest thing to have some way of communicating with officials so that 
they can put the word out that people are being responsible and we have permits and we are not 
stepping outside the boundaries on what we are allowed to take”. Members of the WRT identified 
the need to have increased education for the general public and the agricultural community about 
the impacts of low water.  
Before the LWR program created collaborative WRTs there were also more 
misunderstandings among farmers. The WRT has provided an environment to discuss water use 
among water users and helps ensure that everyone is within the limits of their permits. This does 
not imply that there are no water use issues between farmers, but that there is a more refined 
process to resolve challenges as explained by Respondent 05: 
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Since we have had the LWR team we have had some real dry years … and we never 
had that big of controversy during those years, but I remember before they had that 
there sure as heck was you know. I think we have been able to liaison with growers 
and with the public, the general public in what we’re doing and keeping heads cool 
and make the best of a bad situation without getting into a water war, what they use to 
call it.  
5.2.3 Outcomes 
In 2007 Catfish Creek indicated Level 3 conditions. The team informed OWDC that a 
subwatershed was in Level 3, but did not recommend declaring an official level due to inadequate 
background information. Respondent 07 also expressed that Catfish Creek WRT was hesitant to 
recommend declaring a Level 3 because participants did not want to have restricted access to 
water. This highlights a challenge in local water users participating in decisions to recommend 
water restrictions.   
5.2.4 Implementation 
Water users of the Catfish Creek WRT recognized that a Level 3 has not been declared and 
worried about the implications of it being designated with the present state of the program. 
Respondent 04 questioned “last year [2012] when everybody was scared to death and well what 
does that [Level 3] entail?” In response, Respondent 05 added “yeah and nobody knew how to 
handle it [Level 3].” It was the general opinion of water users that conditions through the PTTW 
should be administered to reduce water taking before Level 3 indicators are met.  
Members of the Catfish Creek WRT believed that a Level 3 was unlikely to ever be 
designated. For instance Respondent 01 noted: “I don’t think we will ever see a Level 3. I’ll be so 
surprised to see a Level 3 and the reason for that is there is just too much at stake”. Respondent 
04 expressed that “you are going to need such a catastrophe summer that hits southwestern 
Ontario before that would in my mind … that it would make sense. Every area gets different 
rainfalls and eventually Mother Nature straightens it up.”  
5.2.4.1 Documented conservation and reduction efforts  
There is not a requirement to report voluntary reduction in water use (Environmental 
Commissioner of Ontario 2012b). Respondent 01 noted that most users reported verbally at 
meetings to reducing use once a level is declared. However, in Catfish Creek there is not the 
capacity to actively collect documentation of water reductions above voluntary reporting (Catfish 
Creek Conservation Authority 2009). Therefore, it is difficult to determine the percentage of 
users who heeded voluntary reductions. One question that arose from document analysis was 
whether a Level 3 recommendation could proceed if the team could not document water use 
reductions during Level 1 and 2 (Catfish Creek Conservation Authority 2009).  
Farmers reported being more receptive to conservation or efficiency messages coming from 
fellow growers rather than from an enforcement agency. This may be due, according to 
Respondent 01, to past conflicts between water users and regulatory agencies. WRT members 
outlined a number of reasons for conservation during times of low water besides in response to 
requested reductions. Often the source becomes unreliable due to the level of water and amount 
of water needed for operations. The cost to irrigate is also increasing and often crops are not 
watered due to the economic impacts. Pursuing water efficient technology and best management 
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practices are in the best interests of the farmers because they are economical. Respondent 04 
noted that “it [farming] is becoming big business and we need to become business oriented and 
part of that is being diplomatic. It’s not the Wild West out here it can’t be.” Respondent 06 
believed that having offline water sources and water permits is a good investment because it will 
increase the value of the property on farms. Respondent 04 said that there was also the 
expectation to conserve because the community is small and prone to gossip if a grower is not 
acting in the community’s best interest. Despite these benefits of water conservation the 
Requirements for Recommending a Level III Report found that “the environmental incentives for 
water reduction are ineffective when livelihood is at risk” (Catfish Creek Conservation Authority 
2009, 15). 
Over time, water users have been making infrastructure investments and management 
decisions to adapt to changing weather, economics and industry standards. The overall reduction 
in water use of individual water users is not reflected in voluntary reductions, which is worrisome 
to some users. For instance, Respondent 01 elaborated on a situation faced by a water user “I 
have already cut back by 50%. I can’t cut back another 20% … [Best Management Practices] 
have already allowed me to cut back and I am pretty much running on the bare minimum because 
of economics”.   
5.2.4.2 Documented social, environmental and economic impact 
Agriculture is a big investment business that has an intensive work load and requires waiting until 
harvest for investments to pay out. One factor that was raised by Respondent 01 is what would 
happen if farmers could not access water and had to watch their crops wither and die while they 
personally may have had access to water. A related question was how would insurance support 
their losses? The LWR program does not guarantee compensation for losses. It was outlined in 
The Requirements for Recommending Level 3 that water reduction tactics are engaged “too late to 
avoid social and economic impacts” and it would be better if there was a proactive approach 
(Catfish Creek Conservation Authority 2009, 16).  
The necessity to gather economic impacts for achieving a Level 3 was believed by 
Respondent 01 to be “a stall tactic for implementing Level 3”. The respondent went on to 
mention that providing evidence of economic impact is difficult given the limited amount of time 
available to gather information for declaring Level 3.  
 Water users interviewed during the study had a strong affinity for environmental 
protection. Respondent 04 elaborated by saying “I think most farmers we love our land, we love 
our farms and we love our wildlife and most of us do not want to do anything detrimental to our 
wildlife. We enjoy seeing our fish and our grandkids go fishing … so we try to draw the line that 
we minimize any effect that we have on the environment.” This sentiment reveals that water users 
would not draw down water resources if there was the potential to negatively affect the 
environment.  
5.2.4.3 Recommendations on Prioritization of Use  
Catfish Creek has not recommended declaring a Level 3 to the OWDC. Therefore, the team had 
less experience than other WRTs in providing supporting documentation. Nonetheless, some 
input regarding declaring a Level 3 was noted in data collection. One document noted that “the 
[Catfish Creek Low Water Response Team] and the CCCA do not have the tools to make an 
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informed calculated decision to provide recommendations regarding water use prioritization 
within the watershed” (Catfish Creek Conservation Authority 2009, 15).  
There was a strong sentiment from Respondent 01 that team members did not know how to 
fairly prioritize use among water users and it was believed that the government should be 
responsible for prioritizing use. “How am I going to recommend that my crop is more valuable 
than yours? How is anybody going to do that … I will not make those recommendations because 
I will not task neighbour against neighbour.”  
5.2.5 Stakeholder Inclusion and Satisfaction with Outcomes  
Water users involved in the WRT appeared to be very involved in team meetings. Their opinions 
were incorporated in decisions related to moving to different levels, and they provided input on 
water levels and past weather conditions. Respondent 03 described their involvement by saying 
“It is definitely their responsibility to keep us involved and have us as a member on the response 
team and the CA looks for input from us during dry weather events or wet weather events”.  
Furthermore, respondents seemed to have a very hands-on approach to implementing the 
decisions from meetings. They discussed LWR with neighbouring farmers, persuaded users to get 
permits to take water and disseminated calls for voluntary reductions. The peer-to-peer process of 
decision-making appeared favourable to water users in Catfish Creek. While visiting a farm I 
observed a discussion of how a collaborative approach like WRTs would be beneficial for 
spreading best practices for nutriment management because it had worked well for LWR. This 
represents that members of collaborative groups believe that the process is an effective 
mechanism for sharing best practices among a local community of practice.  
 Catfish Creek has an active Irrigation Advisory Committee that was initiated through 
funding from OMAF. Meeting minutes show that the Irrigation Advisory Committee shares 
information with the WRT and there are individuals that sit on both committees. When the 
funding for the Irrigation Advisory Committee program stopped the sentiment from farmers 
involved was that it was of no concern if there was funding because it was more important to 
have control of the issue and to work together to solve local challenges (Respondent 02). This 
reflects the satisfaction that came from taking part in local decision-making to address issues that 
are present in the watershed for farmers.   
5.2.6 Summary  
The Catfish Creek WRT is organized and functions as outlined in the LWR program. The team is 
dominated by agricultural interests because the watershed has predominantly agricultural water 
takings. Provincial representatives on the team are responsible for communicating with the 
OWDC and individuals at the provincial level. Water users on the WRT played a large role in 
spreading the message of LWR to other water users. This WRT had very close ties among water 
users. This may be because it is a small watershed. Members of the WRT believed that they were 
fully included in decision-making. WRT members reported large participation on the ground. 
Water users on the team spoke with colleagues to spread word about water conservation and 
voluntary reductions. 
The collaborative process for making decisions about low water was reported to have many 
beneficial outcomes. Increased communication that led to water users having a more direct effect 
on decision-making was highlighted as an improvement to past agency driven attempts at 
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reducing water use. LWR has provided a medium to educate on efficient water use practices and 
methods to share water. Water reduction is a part of responsible business; reduction in water use 
does not necessarily occur because of a level being declared. Farmers may reduce water taking 
because it is in their best interest, the source may have become unreliable or the cost of irrigation 
is too high. However, if crops require water the disincentives during low water are not strong 
enough to curb use.  
Catfish Creek has not recommended declaring Level 3 conditions, but Level 3 conditions 
have existed in the watershed. WRT participants felt that it was unlikely for a Level 3 to ever be 
declared given its current state. CCCA does not have the present capacity to produce the 
information necessary for recommending the OWDC designate Level 3. It is difficult to quantify 
water use reductions during Level 1 and 2 because reductions are based on verbal reports. 
Providing economic impacts to support a Level 3 declaration was understood as a stall tactic and 
finding information was time consuming and difficult. The prioritization of use was believed to 
be better handled by the provincial government and that certain water uses should not be valued 
above others. Many water users appreciate the surrounding environment and want to protect it for 
future generations. 
5.3 Nottawasaga Valley Watershed 
The conceptual framework that was used to organize data analysis also acts as the guide for this 
section. Investigating the watershed and individual scales through the IAD framework provides 
evidence for understanding how the government incorporates collaborative outcomes into final 
decisions. Outcome protection in LWR was explored through implementation of outcomes and 
actor inclusion in the WRT and satisfaction in outcomes.  
5.3.1 Watershed   
The IAD framework overviews the structure, decision-making and outcomes of the WRT. The 
outcomes of the WRT are used to inform decision-making at the provincial level and affect the 
actions of water users at the individual scale. See Table 5.4 for the data from the action arena 
rules as they pertain to the Nottawasaga Valley watershed.  
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Table 5.4: IAD Action Arena  
Rule  Findings  
Position  Water users primarily represent golf courses, agriculture and landscapers.  
 It can be difficult for farmers to attend meeting because it is their busy time of 
year.  
 There needs to be more robust participation from more municipalities.   
 Municipalities that do participate voice general concerns and views of 
municipalities.  
Scope  WRT recommend declaring Level 3 to OWDC, but must provide supporting 
documents. 
 WRT declares Level 1 and 2.  
Authority  NVCA is responsible for collecting and disseminating condition indicators, 
they are the lead on drought planning and play a facilitating role for the WRT.  
 Municipalities represent municipal views on the WRT.  
 Water users represent the views and opinions of their sector.  
 Water users investigate and spread word on conservation practices and 
technologies in their sector. 
Information  Provincial government representatives are the intermediary between WRT and 
OWDC. 
 During meetings water users share industry standards and methods to reduce 
water use without impacting profit.  
 Meetings are as needed.  
 Usually there is one introductory meeting in-person and the following 
meetings are teleconference, but an in-person meeting is arranged if there is 
the potential for a Level 3.  
 Relations among members can be strengthened through working together on 
projects outside of LWR (municipal and government).  
Boundary   Provincial government, municipalities and conservation authorities take part 
in the WRT as part of their duties.  
 Water users that take part volunteer their time to participate in the WRT.  
Aggregation  If required all members usually agree to declare a Level 1 or 2.  
 NVCA and provincial government are non-voting; they provide information. 
 During drastic low water conditions water user that do not participate in the 
WRT are contacted to ensure alternative perspectives are included in decision-
making.  
Payoff  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
 
The responsibility of the WRT and the roles of individual participants largely conform to 
the specifications outlined in the LWR program. Encouraging municipalities and water users to 
attend meetings can be difficult in Nottawasaga Valley because of summer workloads. Some 
municipalities have also had consulting work that demonstrates that reductions to municipal water 
taking would not impact surface water and do not participate. Broad participation is required to 
ensure that many perspectives are included in planning for LWR and voluntary water reductions 
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can be used to support the recommendation to declare a Level 3 if required. During drastic low 
water conditions water users that do not participate in the WRT are contacted to ensure 
alternative perspectives are included in decision-making. This allows for a broader consultation 
of water users and the opportunity to voice alternative views. It was significant that provincial 
representatives report to the staff at the provincial level because it reduces the potential for 
communication between government and the collaborative body.  
5.3.1.1 Patterns of Interaction 
Members of the WRT report working together well; they engage in informative and diverse 
discussions. One of the benefits noted of the WRT is participants get to understand the 
perspectives and realities of various water users. For instance Respondent 16 noted “there is 
always a good communication back and forth between everybody at these meeting … something 
that I wouldn’t necessarily look at from my point of view you can pick up from the rest of the 
group, whether that is from the farming community or the province or the NVCA”. The benefits 
of planning water use was also noted as a positive aspect of the WRT. Respondent 12 noted that 
“I think from a Level 1, Level 2 perspective we find it pretty productive to get everyone at the 
table and talk about how to coordinate water use.” 
5.3.2 Individual  
The individual scale underscores the actions of water users affected by low water decisions made 
at the watershed scale. Individuals can also provide feedback to the provincial scale by the actions 
they choose to take or through direct communication. The action arena examines how water users 
reacted to the decisions of the WRT and whether outcomes were implemented and if water users 
were satisfied by outcomes from the WRT. Figure 5.5 outlines the findings from the action arena.  
Table 5.5: IAD Action Arena  
 
Rule Findings 
Position  Everyone with a PTTW is expected to respond or individuals in sectors 
involved in WRT (including community members). 
Scope  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
Authority  Municipalities take WRT decision into consideration and inform council of 
outcomes and requests to implement water use bylaws. 
 Water users reduce water taking to comply with Level 1 or 2 as best they can. 
Information  Cross pollination between the WRT (reactive) and the Innisfil Creek Water 
Users Association (Proactive) is helpful to be prepared for low water conditions 
in hotspot areas in Nottawasaga Valley. 
 Upper tier municipalities pass along information to lower tier municipalities 
that may not participate. 
Boundary  Water reduction strategies are completely voluntary. 
Aggregation  Participation in water reduction is strictly voluntary. 
Payoff  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
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The voluntary nature of water reduction makes it difficult to know how much water is 
actually being conserved at Level 1 and 2. An area in Nottawasaga that often experiences low 
water situations is Innisfil Creek. The Innisfil Creek Water Users Association is a local water user 
based group that collaborates to coordinate water use during times of low water in the 
subwatershed. It is beneficial to identify areas that face more frequent or severe low water events 
and determine strategies to ameliorate impacts to avoid conflict and personal losses. 
5.3.2.1 Patterns of Interaction 
It is difficult to ensure that a strong consistent conserve message is delivered during low water 
conditions. There are numerous bodies of water in parts of Nottawasaga Valley, as pointed out by 
Respondent 18, so the main perception may be that there is plentiful water and little possibility 
for drought. The general public is not aware of voluntary restrictions by water users during low 
water conditions. Respondent 18 believed that the public observes watering that is taking place 
for agriculture and golf courses and are confused why they are unable to wash their car or water 
their lawn. 
5.3.3 Outcomes  
Subwatersheds in Nottawasaga Valley experienced Level 3 conditions in 2007 and the WRT 
recommended that the OWDC designate Level 3. Provincial representatives on the WRT voiced 
the opinion that there was insufficient documentation, but the team chose to move forward 
because negative environmental consequences were believed to be pressing. The OWDC 
reviewed the proposal from Nottawasaga Valley WRT and declined to designate Level 3 
conditions due to inadequate documentation supporting the claim, especially socio-economic 
information and impacts from mandatory restrictions.  
5.3.4 Implementation 
Members of the WRT believed that designating Level 3 is an important component of low water 
mitigation and education. Level 3 underlines the severity of the conditions and would force water 
users to make reductions in water use. However, Respondent 18 pointed out that the process for 
moving to a Level 3 “is not really well defined for us and we have I think too few people … 
making some of those decisions”. The same respondent noted that “I think there is some merit for 
pushing for a declaration of Level 3 earlier and not waiting …I think if you indicate there is 
actually a Level 3 low water condition people will take it more seriously”.  There is also 
confusion around how restriction would be implemented and what it would mean for water users 
if a Level 3 was declared.  
 Respondent 20 believed that if a Level 3 was implemented there would need to be strict 
enforcement with consequences in order for users to implement water use reductions. This person 
stated that during a Level 3 “it is basically going to mean that they are going to tell us to not 
irrigate and before they go to the individual farmers at the pump site … with a big enough fine to 
shut those systems down it will never happen because there is no way that a grower is going to 
stand by and watch his crop starve and lose his crop”. 
 The political nature of decision-making for LWR was highlighted by three respondents 
(14, 18, 16). This underscores the unlikelihood of Level 3 being called because it would force the 
provincial government to restrict water use to a degree that would negatively impact many users. 
50 
 
Respondent 20 stated “I don’t think you will ever find a politician, to be blunt, with big enough 
balls to call a Level 3”. Another respondent (14) noted that “I don’t think the political will is there 
because to go to Level 3 someone has to decide who is going to get what water and there is a lot 
of money at stake in this thing, so it is a tough decision to have to make”. A newspaper article 
reporting on a WRT meeting also outlined the opposing opinion that the province needs to handle 
the situation delicately to ensure an appropriate response is reached (Saunders 2012).  
 In 2007 it took three weeks for the OWDC to officially decline the recommendation to 
move to a Level 3. Participants felt this was too long, underscored by the fact that by the time the 
decision was made the subwatershed had moved out of Level 3 conditions. However, depending 
on the watercourse there can be minimal past records if monitoring had begun recently. This may 
result in Level 3 conditions or the flow being measured at the lowest recorded flow relatively 
often.  
5.3.4.1 Documented conservation and reduction efforts  
Being involved in LWR has bolstered support for exceeding industry or sector standards and 
encouraged water users to be innovative in reducing water use to become a role model. However, 
producers still need to be aware of consumer demand. On the NVCA Irrigation Tour one stop was 
a sod farm where the accepted practice was to deliver sod brown, but as competitors began to 
irrigate consumers started expecting green sod, which increased irrigation. 
 Nottawasaga Valley is an area of high residential development. Therefore, Respondent 13 
pointed out, there is a tradeoff to consider in buying more efficient technology and investing in 
alternative water sources for agriculture. If the farm is bought with the plan to be developed, 
water security investments will not be recognized by the new buyer of the property. Respondent 
12 said that “you are hearing the frustrations that those farmers are having too, with putting that 
investment in, not knowing long term how useful that is going to be and whether a permit is 
going to be guaranteed.” Respondent 20 felt that shifting water use off of high use or high impact 
surface water sources should be compensated.  
Municipalities have noticed a reduction in water use through monthly billing, which was 
believed to be due to people understanding the importance of conserving water, but also the 
increased cost of water. Water users reported trying to cut back on water use during low water 
conditions. Respondent 18 contributed voluntary water reduction to water users because they 
“recognize if they don’t take some voluntary steps they may have some less palatable things 
[im]posed upon them they are a little bit more willing to think creatively”. However, it is difficult 
for some industries to further reduce their water taking during Level 1 and 2 because they are 
already using the least amount of water possible for financial reasons. Respondent 12 felt that the 
general feeling among water user was “why if I am being as efficient as I can be, why should I 
have to cut back 10% when I already am doing the best I can?”  
 A newspaper article captured a discussion at a WRT meeting where growers promoted 
their belief that famers use good conservation practices all season long and if certain crops do not 
get water at specific times they are not viable for market (Saunders 2012). Water users still report 
adapting their irrigation schedules to the decisions made by the WRT. However, there is no 
method to strategically monitor and document the reductions that are taken at Level 1 and 2 for 
evidence needed for a Level 3 declaration. 
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 In the pilot project undertaken by the NVCA it was highlighted that requiring evidence of 
reductions at Level 1 and 2 might prompt water takers to ignore voluntary reduction in order to 
thwart a Level 3 and the associated restrictions (Low Water Pilot Team Staff 2008). This would 
allow environmentally detrimental impacts to continue. Respondent 18 also felt that “the 
committee is heavily weighted with the people who will be the most negatively impacted by 
significant water restrictions. It makes the decision-making process a bit skewed I think”. Other 
respondents reported that they did respond to the decisions of the WRT and would be supportive 
of moving to a Level 3. Respondent 16 felt that “there was a lot of them in the farming, 
agricultural community that sit on the LWR committee that were for moving forward with it and I 
kind of got the opinion at that point that the province was more or less the push back saying no 
we are not going for that Level 3”.   
5.3.4.2 Documented social, environmental and economic impact 
Respondents from Nottawasaga Valley highlighted the need for a Level 3 declaration to protect 
the environmental function of creeks and streams. In 2007 it was observed that in the Innisfil 
Creek subwatershed the stream was drying up into puddles of isolated water where fish were 
floundering (Saunders 2012). Members of the Innisfil Creek Water Users Association stated that 
during 2007 the stream flow dropped to 350 gallons/minute from an average summer rate of 
5,000 gallons (Centre of South Simcoe 2014). It was expected that this reduction would cause 
significant detrimental impact to the local farming industry, which was valued at $10 million in 
2006 (Centre of South Simcoe 2014). In Nottawasaga Valley, the pilot project report explained, 
the local economy is bolstered by agricultural income, which creates ‘ripple’ effects in the local 
economy (Low Water Pilot Team Staff 2008).  
In general, the NVCA had difficulty in gathering the necessary documents to support a 
Level 3 declaration, especially the social and economic indicators as outlined in the pilot study. 
Conservation authority staff had a short timeframe and inadequate resources to complete the 
collection of material (Low Water Pilot Team Staff 2008). Furthermore, quantifying the social 
and economic impacts of drought is difficult. Despite the fact that the WRT was warned by 
provincial representative that there was insufficient documentation the team believed that it was 
necessary to recommend Level 3 be designated because environmental conditions were critical. 
The pilot report found that “the amount of habitat available for aquatic organisms has been 
significantly reduced” (Low Water Pilot Team Staff 2008, 35). Furthermore, meeting minutes 
highlighted that fish were stranded in isolated puddles and benthic sampling indicated that 
sensitive species had been negatively impacted.  
5.3.4.3 Recommendations on Prioritization of Use  
Members of the WRT found it difficult to determine a prioritization of use because, as pointed 
out by Respondent 12, “how can we tell this person that their livelihood is less important than 
these other people?” It may be easy to suggest that essential uses of water need first priority, but 
the importance of crops is difficult to prioritize because there will always be financial impact 
regardless of the crop type. Various options were discussed by the WRT as outlined in the pilot 
study, but insufficient information was available to effectively prioritize water uses. This resulted 
in in the belief that the provincial government would be better positioned to make decisions on 
who should face water reductions. 
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 One of the recommendations that stemmed from the pilot study in Nottawasaga Valley 
was the belief that there should be equal reductions for online water taking across agricultural 
uses that is not dependent on sectors or crop type. Respondent 20 stated that “there is no priority 
because it affects everybody’s financial bottom line if they can’t irrigate, regardless of what crop 
you are growing”. 
5.3.5 Stakeholder Inclusion and Satisfaction with Outcomes  
Members of the WRT appreciated that the purpose of working together was creating change. 
Respondent 18 noted that: “I don’t need to go to meetings where all we do is discuss the problem 
endlessly. I go there [to WRT meetings] because we are trying to be solution driven and we are 
trying to be mitigative, we are trying to look at what are some things that we can do collectively, 
voluntarily that might lessen the impact of low water or even lessen the likelihood of low water”. 
At the provincial scale Respondent 22 pointed out that “Innisfil is a hot spot. A lot of credit needs 
to go to the farmers in the area because they were willing to put the time forward to help the 
water situation in the area”. 
Trying to mitigate the impacts of low water is a complex policy area. It is difficult to 
impose sanctions that might result in social and economic stress especially because that is what 
LWR is trying to ameliorate. However, there are still challenges the WRT faces in making 
difficult decisions. Respondent 20 noted that: 
I guess there needs to be a team, I guess they are not doing too badly, I guess it is just 
a challenge being on the grower side of it because you know on one hand it seems like 
a bunch of politicians and the political side telling us we can’t irrigate … meanwhile 
we are standing by or expected to kind of half stand by and watch the crops suffer, so 
I guess there is a reason for the team and they are doing as best they can, does it mean 
we always agree with it, I am not so sure.  
Respondent 16 echoed some of this sentiment in discussing the response from the WRT in 2007 
to the rejection of the recommendation for a Level 3 stating:  
It was curious, well some of them were wondering well what is the purpose of the 
LWR team itself if the input is not going to be taken seriously on the provincial level, 
but yeah I would say I kind of felt that myself too, we were looking at it, reviewing 
the stuff and we do see the drops, but it continues on and the weather forecast at the 
time wasn’t looking like it was going to let up.  
This quotation clearly underlines the frustration of seeing environmental stress and the indicators 
necessary to designate Level 3 with no reaction from provincial officials despite the fact that it is 
their role to act on the recommendations of the WRT. 
5.3.6 Summary  
The Nottawasaga Valley WRT functions as outlined in the LWR program report. However, 
inclusion of diverse participants was difficult to achieve and remained a hurdle for representative 
decision-making. The ability of participants on the WRT to skew decision-making against water 
users that are not at the table was highlighted by respondents in the Nottawasaga Valley. 
Provincial representatives on the team are responsible for communicating with the OWDC and 
other provincial departments. The WRT was influential for increasing communication that led to 
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aligning perceptions of different water uses and coordinating water use. However, the public 
requires further education on large water taking operations and the efforts water users take to 
reduce water use during low water. LWR has prompted some water taking industries to 
drastically innovate their uses of water to reduce takings. While other industries may have more 
difficulty in meeting reduction standards and planning water reduction for the future especially 
because of future uncertainty of their need for water, such as with agriculture. Some water users 
report conserving the maximum extent and feel it is unfair that they need to prove additional 
conservation. 
In 2007 most users were in favour of recommending a Level 3, but provincial participants 
advised against it. The WRT recognized the lack of a clear strategy for designating Level 3 and 
implementing water control measures, but thought declaring Level 3 is a necessary step in the 
LWR program. The need to protect the ecological functioning of water courses was a priority for 
the WRT in Nottawasaga Valley. Some respondents felt that not declaring a Level 3 ignored 
detrimental environment impact caused by low water. The political nature of declaring a Level 3 
was noted as skewing the decision not to designate Level 3 and likely will result in Level 3 never 
being designated.  
Members of the WRT believed that if Level 3 is going to be effective at relieving stress 
during emergency low water events the deliberation period for the OWDC needs to be drastically 
reduced. More data also needs to be collected in order to understand when Level 3 conditions are 
present in subwatersheds that do not have historical monitoring data. Collecting documents 
necessary for supporting a recommendation for a Level 3 is difficult especially given the high 
stress atmosphere, quick turn over of necessary documents, lack of resources and difficulty in 
quantifying social and economic stress. Determining a prioritization of use at the watershed level 
was also difficult because it equated to valuing individuals livelihood choices. The general belief 
was that across the board reductions should be implemented instead of restricting a few water 
takers. Member of the WRT saw value in participating on the WRT, but also appeared to have 
individual conflicts with some of the outcomes, in particular being told not to irrigate and a Level 
3 not being declared in 2007.  
5.4 Grand River Watershed 
The IAD framework’s action arena and patterns of interaction are used to discuss the structure of 
decision-making in the WRT and the reaction of water users locally. The watershed and 
individual scales shed light on how the provincial government incorporates outcomes from the 
WRT into final decision-making. Implementation and WRT member inclusion and satisfaction 
will provide insight into whether the government is respecting the outcomes from WRTs. Level 3 
is the core of analysis for determining whether outcomes are protected. Therefore, the necessary 
documentation and prioritization for use was the focus.  
5.4.1 Watershed  
The IAD framework will overview the structure, decision-making and outcomes of the WRT. The 
outcomes of the WRT are used to inform decision-making at the provincial level and affect the 
actions of water users at the individual scale. See Table 5.6 for the data of the action arena rules 
as they pertain to the Grand River watershed. 
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Table 5.6: Action Arena  
Rule Findings 
Position  The participants involved in the WRT are numerous and diverse.  
 Agriculture representatives are key actors in some subwatersheds, but there 
are also golf course representatives, aggregate, recreational users, First Nation 
representation and industry.  
 Municipalities are the largest water user in the watershed.  
 There are many small municipalities in the Grand River watershed. 
Scope  Members are expected to promote voluntary water reductions and provide 
recommendations to the WRT.  
 WRT declare Level 1 and 2.  
 Recommend declaring a Level 3 to the OWDC.  
Authority  WRT members attend meetings, communicate information discussed with 
respective sectors, share data and provide a responsible response to low water 
conditions.  
 The team meets through teleconference as required, which is often weekly 
during dry weather and they try to have one face to face meeting early in the 
year. 
 A conservation authority representative co-chairs the WRT and is responsible 
for measuring and providing indicators for precipitation and flow. 
 Municipalities attend meetings and provide context for water withdraw. 
 Water users provide context and conservation strategies from their sector. 
Information  GRCA depends on partner support for operations, which is reflected in LWR.  
 Open discussion with participation from all stakeholders is typical of WRT 
meetings.  
 The watershed is spatially large and often there will be different issues and 
declared levels in subwatersheds.  
 All issues are discussed on one call and participants are informed of issues 
throughout the watershed.  
 The team works together to build cooperative relationships instead of just 
relying on government applying restrictions. 
Boundary   Conservation authorities, government and municipalities take part in LWR as 
part of employment duties.  
 Representatives from different sectors are asked to participate, but it is 
completely voluntary.  
Aggregation  Decisions made through consensus.  
 All participants share the same responsibilities except for provincial 
government who are non-voting.  
Payoff  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
 
The responsibility of the Grand River WRT and the roles of individual participants largely 
conform to the specifications outlined in the LWR program. The WRT coordinates short term 
activities during dry conditions to ensure “balance[d] efficient use, protection of the resource and 
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equity among users” (Grand River Conservation Authority 2011, 1). The watershed is large and 
includes diverse water use sectors, which requires broad participation. The size and diversity also 
result in meetings taking place through teleconference to ensure participants can more easily take 
part. The fact that a provincial representative interacts with the provincial level is significant, but 
may be necessary for ease of operation because they are familiar with government practices.  
5.4.1.1 Patterns of Interaction  
The Grand River WRT is a diverse group. The WRT works well together and debates opinions 
openly, as expressed in the following quotation from Respondent 15, “I think you find that we get 
very open and honest participation in our groups we try to make a point of being very inclusive 
because we do have a very diverse water using sector it is numerous and large”. The team 
understands that water users in subwatersheds may need to support Level 1 declaration due to 
issues in other subwatersheds and respects making voluntary reductions to support other team 
members circumstances. Respondent 19 pointed out that this “help[s] essentially build that social 
and community capacity that we are seeing … there is greater awareness there is greater 
perspective of the need to implement an interim response”.  
5.4.2 Individual  
The individual scale underscores the actions of water users affected by low water decisions made 
at the watershed scale. Individuals can also provide feedback to the provincial scale by the actions 
they choose to take or through direct communication. The action arena examines how water users 
reacted to the decisions of the WRT and whether outcomes were implemented and if water users 
were satisfied by outcomes from the WRT. Figure 5.7 outlines the findings from the action arena.  
Table 5.7: Action Arena  
Rule Findings 
Position  Everyone with a PTTW or individuals in sectors involved in WRT (including 
community members). 
Scope  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
Authority  Conservation authorities can adjust reservoir reserves to bolster the flows of 
rivers, streams and creeks. 
 Municipalities enforce bylaws during low water conditions.  
 Water users voluntarily reduce water use and spread word of reductions to 
their sector. 
Information  Municipal and conservation authority messaging in the watershed is locally 
focused.  
 Water users share reduction strategies within their sector.  
Boundary   Involvement is purely voluntary and depends on the operation and the source 
of water. 
Aggregation  Participation in water reduction is strictly voluntary. 
Payoff  Water users voluntarily reduce water use at Level 1 and 2. 
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The voluntary nature of water reductions at Level 1 and 2 makes it difficult to directly 
measure conservation efforts and the impact that water reductions have on the natural 
environment. The Grand River watershed has a number of areas that experience frequent low 
water conditions, including Whitemans Creek and the Speed and Eramosa Rivers. Municipalities 
and the conservation authority can take actions to reduce the impact of low water through water 
management actions, such reservoir drawdown. These actions can provide short-term relief that 
reduces the need to declare a Level 3, but may not be sustainable in long-term drought conditions. 
5.4.2.1 Patterns of Interaction  
There is a wide variety of responses from corporate or industrial water users. Some industries 
have multiple strategies for ensuring compliance and work to be good corporate citizens, but 
others are not inclined to reduce water use. This may be due to the type of industry and the extent 
their actions are visible to the public. Respondents 11 and 12 expressed that there are many 
misconceptions about large water users that may stem from the media or community action 
groups. These respondents thought that education is needed to stop misconceptions. Golf courses, 
noted Respondent 09, may be understood by the public as an aesthetic use, but they generate jobs 
in the community and provide opportunities for recreation and leisure. 
 Document analysis revealed that farmers in the Grand River believed that Irrigation 
Advisory Committees could be beneficial for reducing water use in high stress areas, but “in 
practice they are not realistic” (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008, 37). “When the 
farmer’s livelihood is at stake, the call from another farmer to cut back on water use isn’t going to 
change their watering schedule” (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008, 37). 
 In Grand River watershed there have been observed changes to social norms of the 
general public. In response to water use reduction bylaws, Respondent 19 noted that “we are 
seeing 60 or 65 percent of households saying that they don’t water their lawn any longer”. Not 
watering a lawn during low water conditions can be a point of pride for homeowners and they can 
pressure neighbours to reduce their outside water use. However, during water restrictions it is 
difficult to enforce public cutbacks while large water users are visibly using water. Anglers near 
Whitemans Creek who are asked to comply with restrictions during low water find it difficult to 
adhere to restriction if it appears that agricultural water withdrawals in the area are continuing 
unhampered (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). Voluntary measures of compliance and 
alternative water sources should be better communicated to ensure respected compliance and 
maintain cordial relations between water takers and recreational water users, such as anglers 
(Grand River Conservation Authority 2008).  
5.4.3 Outcomes  
Subwatershed in Grand River watershed experienced Level 3 conditions in 2007 and 2012. In 
2007 the team recommended that the OWDC designate Level 3, whereas in 2012 the team simply 
informed the OWDC that Level 3 indicators were present in the watershed, but did not 
recommend a Level 3 declaration. The OWDC did not declare a Level 3 in 2007. However, the 
decision took three weeks and by the time it was reached the low water situation had resolved 
itself.  
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5.4.4 Implementation 
Data analysis revealed that the LWR program is an appropriate strategy for reacting to low water 
conditions. “We actually have a program that is around 13-14 years old now and it still works” 
(Respondent 15). The benefit of using a collaborative approach for decision-making was also 
recognized by Respondent 09 who believed that getting the buy-in of participants allowed for 
greater impact than imposing restrictions. Two respondents believed that the WRT was effective 
in coming to consensus on decisions and spreading word of the decisions reached (15 and 10). 
The approach, Respondent 09 believed, successfully incorporated different types of water users 
and created concern about the effects of low water on all sectors.  
In terms of implementing Level 3, Respondent 15 recognized that it is a difficult political 
decision because it would result in heavy enforcement, which is unpopular with water users who 
need access to water resources. “They had a real reluctance to … tell people to cut back. Now you 
are getting into the real political fire storm and that is the type of thing where if you want to enact 
tough legislation … there are political consequences”. Another perspective was that the LWR 
process is a scientific process and indicator based so coming to a conclusion is relatively easy 
without fostering resentment among team members (Respondents 10 and 11). This leads to the 
belief that Level 3 had not been declared because it was not warranted by the science-based 
evidence.   
Grand River has a few subwatersheds that enter Level 3 conditions regularly. However, 
Level 3 is supposed to represent an imperiled supply and an emergency situation. This highlights 
the need for indicators that specify unusually low water levels that are locally sensitive and the 
need for localized funding to support areas that have more frequent low water conditions. Several 
agencies have tried to persuade water users, especially agricultural users, in subwatersheds that 
experience more frequent low water conditions to invest in off-source supplies of water (Kovacs 
2013). Respondent 15 noted there is a balance between dealing with emergency and preparing 
ourselves to make sure we have resilience so we are not getting into emergency. There needs to 
be a clearer response from the province to low water, and more rapid decision making. 
Respondent 15 went on to compare the emergency response of LWR to the emergency response 
of fighting a fire by saying “when you call 911 … to put out a fire they don’t scratch their heads 
and think ‘oh boy does anybody have a road map or … does anyone remember where we put the 
hoses you know (snap) you’re there you’re in the truck responding”.   
5.4.4.1 Documented conservation and reduction efforts  
There are often company based water management strategies to limit water taking that are aimed 
at protecting water resources, which was pointed out by Respondent 10. These come into effect 
even without a level being declared. Responded 09 also noted that most water users expect Level 
1 or 2 declarations because they can observe low water conditions and understand the need to 
voluntarily reduce water taking.  
Establishing a secure water source – through creating an irrigation pond or investing in 
efficient technology – is part of adaptive thinking and will be beneficial in the future as a backup 
plan during low water conditions (Kovacs 2013). Voluntary reduction at an equal rate for all 
users may not be fair (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). If users have developed 
alternative management plans, or invested in efficient machinery, then they have already cut back 
water use, which reduces water use at all times instead of just in crisis times. It is important to 
58 
 
build alternatives and to discuss reduction before low water conditions arise so that in times of 
crisis there is a plan of action. Water users in general are creating effective water management 
plans and investing in efficient equipment (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). It is 
increasingly difficult to meet voluntary reduction because, as Respondent 15 pointed out, “when 
the time comes to go that extra mile it is not as easy you know the fats been cut off the bone”. 
Efficiency in machinery and management practices is the ultimate goal for water users because it 
reduces costs by minimizing fuel use and water loss. This encourages constant water conservation 
instead of conservation during crisis. Respondent 15 noted that “the problem is when you get into 
a program like this one that has evolved and developed and matured over you know 10-15 year 
period where the strategy was cut back 10%, cut back 20% over time the baseline keeps 
dropping”. This means that it can be increasingly difficult to meet voluntary reduction targets as 
efficiency improves.  
In the agricultural sector, most farmers have wise use management plans for efficient water 
use that have emerged through changing industry standards and economic need. Farmers reported 
at a workshop that they do not waste water (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). Irrigation 
is expensive and stressful for farmers and they only use it when necessary. However, the 
necessity to water at certain times limits the ability of farmers to reduce their usage during levels 
because if they do not water they will be behind on watering needs, which could imperil the crop 
(Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). Respondent 15 elaborated on a potential situation by 
saying “telling a farmer not to use as much water, they will mentally do the math and say …‘if 
you are going to fine me I will work out the cost of the fine and I will pay the fine because it is 
cheaper than losing my whole year’s crop”.  
Municipal officials also heard complaints about individuals watering their lawn despite 
restrictions. However, overall municipalities report a reduction on demand during Level 1 and 2. 
A survey in the Whitemans Creek pilot project reported that most respondents were aware of the 
level changes and request for voluntary reductions (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). 
About half reported reducing their water use and most of the other half reported using 
conservation measures in regular management.  
5.4.4.2 Documented social, environmental and economic impact 
In the Level 3 pilot project, of the farmers who were surveyed, most reported that they did not 
have supply issues in the summer of 2007. However, some reported crop loss and reduced value 
of crops. Personal stress was also reported as a byproduct of the dry conditions.   
If Level 3 was designated and mandatory water cutbacks were enforced it is likely that 
business would suffer economically (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). Farmers in 
particular would have a high likelihood of losing the income from that year’s crop. Depending on 
the crop there might be detrimental impacts on future growth resulting from drought impacts. For 
example, blueberries are susceptible to this kind of stress. It was also believed that if a Level 3 
was designated provisions for compensation for lost profit should be included in planning. Long-
term property value was called into question if Level 3 was declared and future land buyers could 
expect hindrances on accessing water (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008).  
One of the challenges identified was that the WRT had put together the necessary 
documents to support a Level 3 declaration and the role of the OWDC is to act on their 
recommendations. However, Respondent 19 pointed out that the degree of information and level 
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of involvement required from the WRT was largely unknown while making recommendations to 
the OWDC. The view expressed was that the respondent “would like to see some clear protocol 
about essentially how does that decision happen and I think it would certainly add some 
transparency to the process”.  
It is difficult to quickly gather information on economic and social impacts to low water 
(Respondent 15). Furthermore, it is difficult to quantify these impacts. However, a quick reaction 
is necessary in order to stop detrimental impacts. Respondent 15 pointed out that “The way it was 
set up it was very difficult to get a quick response and the type of information we were gathering 
… it took way too long and by the time we got everything together the situation was basically 
gone or the types of threats that you were trying to deal with had either created a problem or 
resolved themselves”.  
5.4.4.3 Recommendations on Prioritization of Use  
The GRCA attempted to value crops in an effort to understand how to prioritize different sectors 
within agriculture (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). However, the process revealed 
that it is difficult to use crop valuation as a factor of prioritization because the livelihoods of 
farmers will be imperiled if their crop is valued as less important. Furthermore, the type of crops 
grown is dependent on farmer expertise, soil type, market demand, etc. and it is not the business 
of non-farmers to judge the type of crops individuals decide to grow (Respondent 15). The water 
use reductions at Level 3 were recommended to be more effective if they are implemented across 
all users as oppose to highlighting a few non-priorities (Grand River Conservation Authority 
2008).  
5.4.5 Stakeholder Inclusion and Satisfaction with Outcomes  
Evidence from interviews suggests that local knowledge was respected in decision-making. 
Respondent 19 believed that “there is a feeling that we can inform what a response might look 
like in our individual communities knowing what we do about our systems or the nature of peak 
demand”. The same respondent also appreciated being involved in an initiative that provides 
something tangible: “it helps to reinforce some of the communication locally and provide 
something that is really tangible”. 
Through communication on the WRT there has been improved understanding among water 
users in the case study area. Respondent 15 noted that “I think we have developed a much better 
understanding of who does what and why, which helps us to maybe approach resolution of the 
problem in a different way”. Evidence from interviews suggested that a valuable outcome was 
that participating in LWR creates many opportunities to communicate with other water users in 
the region, which would otherwise not happen. Respondent 10 expanded on this point by saying 
“tremendously valuable. You know for no other reason the power of networking bringing the 
brightest minds together in the Region to talk about what is going on … it is a real resource”.  
5.4.6 Summary 
The WRT is arranged and functions in accordance with the specifications discussed in the 
LWR program. Participants share best management practices within water use sectors. The 
importance of adapting water use to the potential for low water conditions was noted as valuable 
for individual water users. Many water users have created adaptive management plans for 
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reducing water in order to save money and time. However, it is difficult to further reduce water 
during Level 1 and 2 with efficient water management strategies. There are misconceptions in the 
public about some large use water sectors. Increased education is required to inform the public on 
the practices and conservation strategies of large water users. However, the public is increasingly 
aware of the need to alter their personal water consumption practices and conservation is 
emerging as a social value. LWR was identified as a beneficial program for effectively reacting to 
low water conditions. A main outcome from participating in the WRT is increased 
communication, which leads to better and informed decisions.  
A number of subwatersheds in the Grand River experience frequent low water conditions 
that exhibit Level 3 characteristics. This demonstrates the need to clarify and improve indicators 
in these regions to understand when an emergency happens and to localize funding in these areas 
to support a response. Respondents also noted the necessity of a faster response from the OWDC 
to designate Level 3 conditions or decide a designation is unwarranted. Most water users have 
conservation strategies and recognize the importance of protecting and sharing water resources. 
During the low water conditions in 2007 most water users reported the ability to access 
required water, but some farmers reported crop loss, reduced crop value and emotional stress 
from low water (Grand River Conservation Authority 2008). If Level 3 is designated, it was 
reported as likely that there would be detrimental economic impact and it was hoped that 
compensation would be part of declaring a Level 3. Respondents noted that it is difficult to gather 
the necessary documentation for supporting a Level 3 declaration. The GRCA attempted to create 
a priority of use among agricultural sectors through economic valuation. However, it is difficult 
to determine a prioritization of use because livelihood is always at stake. The required 
information for recommending a Level 3 for the first time was not clearly understood. A 
framework needs to be determined to guide WRTs on the necessary components of 
recommending a Level 3.  
5.5 Cross-Case Analysis 
The case study approach provided strong evidence that government incorporates all WRT 
decisions the same way. The LWR program explicitly lays out the design of how groups are 
formed and how the group interacts with government, which is adhered to in practice. At the 
provincial scale all of the rules were adhered to in practice as they are outlined in the LWR 
program. At the watershed level the case studies conformed to the decision-making rules outlined 
in the LWR document, except Catfish Creek and Nottawasaga Valley noted a limited role for 
municipalities and expressed difficulty in farmers being able to attend meetings. It is likely that 
all WRTs have provincial representatives as the intermediary between the watershed scale and the 
provincial scale. The rules for individuals at the local level were performed largely as expected. 
However, water users may decide the cost of reducing water use is not prudent for their business 
operations.  
Information is the main deliverable that WRTs supply to the OWDC. This does not 
represent a major shift in the way government decisions are made or how government functions; 
it maintains a hierarchical relationship where the provincial government maintains control over 
final decision-making. However, there is evidence that collaborative approaches to environmental 
decision-making provide opportunities for improving the relationships between government 
officials and water users, which can harbour mutual respect and trust.   
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In the Catfish Creek case, WRT members interviewed for the study seemed to be pleased 
with the outcome protection measures supplied by the government. However, their WRT has not 
gone through the process of applying for a Level 3 declaration. When Level 3 conditions were 
met the team decided to inform the OWDC that Level 3 conditions were present, but did not 
recommend declaring Level 3. However, in Nottawasaga Valley and Grand River the process of 
trying to move forward through a Level 3 declaration process was very frustrating according to 
interview subjects. It took a lot of time and expertise to put together a report outlining the 
required support for declaring Level 3. The OWDC, in the case of respondents from Nottawasaga 
Valley and Grand River, took too much time to reach a decision. In these cases, WRT 
respondents believed that the province had not respected the opinions of the WRTs and had failed 
to make timely decisions, which was detrimental for effective drought planning. The sense that 
the government was not fulfilling its responsibilities was more explicit in Nottawasaga Valley, 
where respondents called into question the purpose of the WRT and the commitment of the 
government to protecting the environment from low water conditions. In the Grand River case 
there was more emphasis on improving the role of indicators to measure when emergency 
situations had been reached, the need for a clearer framework outlining what is expected of 
WRTs at Level 3, and transparency in how OWDC decisions are made.  
The responses’ from government participants focused on whether the conditions for Level 3 
have actually been met in Ontario. Water management efforts can largely supplement low flows 
and ensure water users have access to water. The government is reluctant to unnecessarily restrict 
water user’s access to water and can use the threat of declaring Level 3 to spur individual water 
reduction and conservation efforts before an emergency situation. 
5.6 Summary 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the case studies were compared to determine whether WRTs had similar 
experiences with government incorporating outcomes in final decision-making and the extent 
government protected the outcomes from collaborative groups. Interviews were essential for 
understanding the perspectives of members of the WRT. Document analysis and observation 
supplemented the finding from interviews and provided other perspectives that were missed.  
The comparison of cases revealed that WRTs face many of the same opportunities and 
challenges in making decisions about low water. Collaboration has increased communication 
between water users and enforcement agencies and among water users, which has resulted in 
beneficial relationships. These relationships have created opportunities to share best management 
practices for conserving water. The process has also created acceptance among different sectors 
that require water. Some of the challenges that WRTs face are based on the nature of responding 
to low water. It is relatively easy to voluntarily reduce water during Level 1 and 2, but when the 
situation is more dire it becomes difficult. There is also little time for improving planning outside 
of low water conditions so it can be stressful or rushed.   
The process to declare a Level 3 has many hurdles that are acknowledged by all actors in 
LWR. First, there is not the capacity to supply the required documents the OWDC need to 
designate a Level 3. There are also large unknowns about exactly what is required in 
documentation, how it should be measured and how the OWDC make decisions about tradeoffs 
between economic and environmental factors. There were important differences among case 
studies regarding the degree to which it was felt outcomes were protected. If the process to 
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recommend a Level 3 has not been experienced, such as in Catfish Creek, it is likely that the 
WRT will be pleased with outcomes. Whereas the process of declaring Level 3 can increase the 
sentiment that outcomes are not being protected, especially if environmental impacts are evident. 
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6 Chapter 6 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of this research was to understand how the outcomes from collaborative processes 
are incorporated into government decision-making and to assess the extent government is 
protecting outcomes from collaborative groups. This research examined these issues through a 
case study of LWR in Ontario. The IAD framework, supported with indicators from the 
collaborative governance and environmental management literatures, was used as a conceptual 
framework to guide research. This chapter discusses key findings and the implications of this 
research for designing collaborative approaches for informing environmental decision-making. 
Chapter 6 also presents limitations of this study and opportunities for future research.  
6.1 Summary of Key Findings  
Collaborative approaches for environmental decision-making are increasingly being used by 
government (Emerson, et al. 2012; Lockwood, et al. 2010; Robinson, et al. 2011). Therefore, it is 
essential to understand how governments use these initiatives for decision-making and whether 
collaboratively-produced outcomes are protected. Challenges have begun to emerge from the 
practice of governments using collaborative approaches for decision-making. One significant 
challenge is that there is a gap between collaborative groups providing recommendations to 
government and those recommendations being integrated in final decisions by governments. This 
lack of transparency in how outcomes from collaborative groups are used can result in adversarial 
relationships forming between government and members of the collaborative decision-making 
group if the members of those groups believe their decisions are undervalued or ignored. If 
participants believe that their input is not being incorporated into decision-making, then they may 
view the collaborative process as a guise that does not actually reflect public input (Kallis, et al. 
2009) and they may raise barriers to future implementation surrounding the issue (Richie, et al. 
2012). 
 There is disagreement in the literature about the role that collaborative approaches play in 
evolving environmental institutions and norms for public consultation (Newell, et al. 2012; 
Watson, et al. 2009). Clarifying the roles that collaborative approaches play in informing 
environmental management and policy will assist in managing expectations for what can be 
achieved through collaborative means. Furthermore, how governments use outcomes from 
collaborative approaches should be clarified early in the process and communicated with 
members of the collaborative group.  
6.2 Incorporating Collaborative Outcomes in Government Decisions 
This research had two main purposes; the first was to understand how outcomes from 
collaborative bodies are incorporated into government decision-making. A number of findings 
emerged that contribute to understanding how collaborative processes are used by governments, 
which adds to the general literature on collaborative governance and recommendations for 
practice.  
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In LWR the role of government is not being reduced through collaborative processes.  
Government informs the process and has control over whether to designate a Level 3. The case of 
LWR in Ontario supports the view that collaborative approaches are not creating transformational 
change in government decision-making as debated in the collaborative governance literature 
(Newell, et al. 2012; Watson, et al. 2009). Provincial representatives are responsible for the 
highest level of decision-making and rely on collaborative bodies to provide input and 
recommendations into their decisions. However, the recommendations do not necessarily reflect 
the decisions ultimately made by the government.  
In this case the collaborative process did not represent institutional overlay as discussed by 
Biermann, et al. (2007) and Meadowcroft (2007). The collaborative process provided additional 
benefits that would not have been produced through conventional government processes. The use 
of WRTs increased communication among water users, which led to better understanding among 
team members and cordial relations. Many water users were persuaded to implement initial or 
better water management protocols, which may be due to the collaborative process or it may be a 
sign of adapting to a changing economic climate. Importantly, individual water users began to see 
their water use as part of a collective impact on the watershed scale.  
6.3 The Extent Government is Protecting Outcomes  
The second purpose of this research was to determine the extent government is protecting the 
outcomes from collaborative approaches to decision-making. The findings that discuss the extent 
to which government is protecting the outcomes cannot be generalized for all WRTs in Ontario. 
Each WRT had a different reaction to Level 3 not being designated and the Level 3 process in 
general.  
The evidence suggests that outcomes are largely being protected through LWR. This is 
largely due to the nature of the collaborative process being action-focused for local participants, 
and the direct role they play in implementation. However, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, 
devolving implementation tasks can lead to accountability deficiencies (Australian Public Service 
Commission 2009; Watson, et al. 2009). Although most participants are largely pleased with the 
outcomes of WRTs, the continued absence of a Level 3 declaration weighs on the effectiveness of 
the program. The research suggests that over time, displeasure could build among WRTs that 
continue to experience drastic and prolonged low water conditions without a Level 3 declaration. 
Similar challenges were identified in each case study for recommending the OWDC 
designate a Level 3. The additional measures that required documentation beyond physical 
indicators for stream flow and precipitation were difficult, time-consuming and expensive to 
collect. The need for WRTs to document reductions at Level 1 and 2 was identified as a major 
hurdle given the voluntary nature of the program. One concern raised was that water users may 
not report reducing water use during Level 1 and 2 to avoid restrictions at Level 3, although this 
was not apparent in case studies. The requirement to document social, economic and 
environmental impact is also challenging. It is easy to measure environmental impact, but 
documenting social and economic impacts is difficult especially because the expertise in 
conservation authorities is largely focused on biophysical conditions as oppose to social science. 
Furthermore, the specific information that is required for a successful recommendation to OWDC 
is not well understood.  
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Some of the reasons for the OWDC not declaring a Level 3 are program-specific. Level 3 is 
supposed to be an ‘emergency’ protocol. One of the indicators required for declaring a Level 3 is 
demonstrating social, environmental and economic harm. However, there are already tools in 
place to prevent these damages during ‘normal’ water levels through the PTTW administered by 
the MOE. In the data collected for this study, there is evidence suggesting that an emergency 
situation has never happened because there are actions that can mitigate the impact of low water, 
such as drawing down reservoirs to supplement natural flows. On the other hand the purpose of 
the WRTs is to represent the local reality. If the team believes that levels will have a harmful 
impact, some WRT members felt it was up to the government to respect the decision of the WRT 
because the government mandated them this role. Furthermore, in the case of extreme drought 
water management actions to control low water are only beneficial for short-term low water 
episodes where there is still water in reservoirs to manage.  
A Level 3 may never be designated until the uncertainties surrounding the prioritization of 
use are resolved. Members of the WRTs in Nottawasaga Valley and Grand River expressed the 
need for a framework that outlines the necessary steps for recommending a Level 3 and 
transparency of the OWDC process for evaluating the recommendation. The initial steps of this 
process have begun through the pilot studies lead by GRCA and NVCA, but more work is 
required to fully understand how to prioritize use. The OWDC believe that the WRTs should 
inform a prioritization of use while all three WRTs believe that prioritization should be a 
provincial government responsibility. Locally deciding on a prioritization of use is difficult 
because the decisions would harm individual livelihoods; there may be team biases based on who 
is at the table and uncertainties of whether participants represent an individual or a community of 
practice; and challenges of having the capacity to determine a method for prioritizing use. These 
concerns point to the potential for accountability issues if a small group of people is responsible 
for prioritizing water use because the decisions may not be impartial.   
Environmental indicators, such as stream flow and precipitation, are easy to measure to 
support a Level 3, but appear to not carry much weight in the final decision of the OWDC. 
Members of the LWR team have highlighted the negative impacts to aquatic ecosystems from 
low water conditions. Despite the level of awareness of the environmental effects from low water, 
specific knowledge as to how the ecosystem will rebound requires further study. Without 
understanding the implications of frequent low water conditions in aquatic ecosystems the 
necessity of declaring a Level 3 to protect health of streams will be in question. The other 
consideration is that the MOE can act to restrict water taking outside of a Level 3 due to the 
conditions laid out in permits. If there are low flows in tributaries that have withdrawals from 
water users with permits, their takings (or unpermitted takings) can be reduced due to the impact 
they are creating on the natural environment. The MOE has the regulatory power and tools to 
restrict water uses that have a detrimental impact on the environment.  
The case of LWR in Ontario appears to focus on the individual scale for protecting the 
outcomes at least at Level 1 and 2. This might explain why Level 1 and 2 are so successful: local 
actors implement local solutions. However, designating a Level 3 requires restricting access to 
water, which in the past has led to contentious relations between water users and government. 
The government also works to create business opportunities for economic growth, which requires 
full access to resources, such as water. By shifting the responsibility to WRTs to determine when 
and what water users should be impacted by restrictions, I believe through evaluation of the 
evidence that the government is attempting to remove itself from complex decisions. 
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6.4 Case-specific Recommendations  
This research provided the opportunity for multiple actors engaged in LWR to express their 
experiences and recommendations for improving the program. These recommendations, along 
with findings from this research, illuminate a number of suggestions that could benefit planning 
for low water conditions in Ontario.  
The purpose of the LWR program is to provide local, short-term management of low water 
conditions. However, LWR, in conjunction with other programs and initiatives that promote 
sustainable water resource practices, has resulted in long-term adaptive planning. Many water 
users in Ontario have moved all or some of their water taking off of surface water sources. Some 
surface water sources that once experienced regular low water conditions (particularly around the 
Catfish Creek watershed) have been experiencing fewer and less drastic low water episodes since 
the beginning of the LWR program and the incentives for moving water taking off source water. 
If the long term could be taken into consideration during LWR planning and WRT meetings these 
benefits could have a greater, more directed impact. The lack of future planning and management 
in LWR is one of the gaps of the program. 
Overall, the LWR program is effective at Level 1 and 2. Furthermore participant inclusion 
at Level 1 and Level 2 are beneficial for alleviating low water conditions and for making actors 
feel like a valued part of the process. Water users have also started to shift their perspectives of 
the impact of their water taking from individual impact to collective impact on the watershed 
from all users. These connections that are created during LWR are important aspects of future 
implementation. Ananda et al. (2009) discussed that just because outcomes – a Level 3 
declaration in the case of LWR – are not achieved does not mean that the instructional structure is 
inefficient. 
There appear to be skewed expectations held by governments and members of the WRT 
based on what collaborative processes will achieve. Some participants may believe that 
collaborative processes provide them the ability to set the decision, which is then implemented by 
government. Governments may believe that the collaborative body will provide advice closely 
aligned to their mandate that will be realistic and fair. Aligning expectations of what outcomes 
will be between government and participants is an important first steps in ensuring outcomes are 
protected. 
Accountability in LWR needs to be further explored to understand who is responsible for 
fulfilling tasks, most notably the prioritization of use. To date low water conditions resulting in 
Level 3 indicators may be relatively easy to excuse based on lack of social and economic stress. If 
low water conditions similar to the experience of the late 1990’s, that propelled the LWR 
program into existence, return a framework must be available to ameliorate some of the stress on 
water users and protect the environment. If this framework is not in place and the provincial 
government cannot deliver a collective premeditated response this will reflect a failure of 
preparation and may result in water users harboring adversarial relations toward government and 
other water users, as experienced in other case studies (Kallis, et al. 2009; Richie, et al. 2012). 
Accountability measures would ensure that actors know their role and have appropriate 
expectations for what can be achieved through collaborative approaches and resulting 
government action. 
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Accountability considerations may be one of the reasons government is reluctant to fully 
incorporate the recommendations made by WRTs. If the government believes that the 
recommendation to move to a Level 3 is not in the best interests of the public they may hesitate to 
implement the decision. As discussed by Schillemans (2008) there needs to be horizontal 
accountability to ensure that the decisions emerging from collaborative bodies take into 
consideration the needs of all instead of the opinions and needs of just water users.  
6.5 Scholarly Contributions  
The purpose of this research was primarily to understand how collaborative outcomes are 
incorporated into government decision-making and to determine the extent governments are 
respecting the outcomes of collaborative approaches. Research into government-led collaborative 
approaches for decision-making contributes to the body of literature on collaborative governance 
and environmental management. Furthermore, practical contributions for government decision-
makers and policy analysts were apparent.  
The types of outcomes being produced may contribute to whether participants believe 
outcomes are being respected in collaborative approaches. For instance, examples from the 
literature on government not respecting outcomes tend to be policy or program focused. 
Therefore, if the recommendations from the collaborative body are not included in the final 
policy it would be more obvious that outcomes are not respected because the policy is the sole 
outcome. In terms of LWR the implementation at Level 1 and 2 have water users directly 
involved in water reductions and communicating with other members in their sector the 
importance of water conservation and efficiency. This represents more of an action focused 
outcome that has participants directly engaged in implementation. Participants may believe that 
their recommendations are not being respected by government on declaring a Level 3, but there 
are a number of other factors where there is government support and understanding, especially 
from provincial government members of the WRT.  
By focusing on implementation it would appear that government is not respecting outcomes 
because a Level 3 was not declared in Nottawasaga Valley or Grand River despite the WRTs 
recommendation and observed environmental impacts. By investigating process and social 
outcomes, such as stakeholder inclusion and satisfaction in the process, it is more apparent that 
collaboration is producing outcomes that are beneficial for participants and protected by 
government. This highlights that including tangible as well as intangible outcome indicators is 
essential to understanding collaborative processes.  
Practically, in government-led collaborative approaches to decision-making more emphasis 
needs to be placed on balancing expectations between government and members of collaborative 
groups. Governments need to consider what types of outcomes they require for making decisions 
and how the outcomes from collaborative groups will be incorporated into decision-making. 
These expectations need to be shared with the collaborative group in the early stages of its 
creation. The collaborative body should likewise be given the opportunity to explain their 
expectations for what the collaborative group will accomplish and how the government will 
respond. Greater communication between government and members of collaborative groups is 
required in the early stages of collaboration.  
The perception of whether government is protecting outcomes from collaborative groups 
will change over time and may depend on key actors within the collaborative group. If there is an 
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outspoken member of a collaborative group that has the ability or power to sway others’ 
perceptions that person may be able to ingrain a belief that the government is or is not respecting 
outcomes.  
6.6 Limitations and Research Opportunities  
Limitations that became evident during this research are discussed here to reveal the strengths and 
limitations of the study, and to highlight future opportunities for studying collaborative 
approaches to decision-making. First, this research used a small number of factors 
(implementation, stakeholder inclusion and satisfaction) for assessing how government uses the 
outcomes from collaborative groups and whether recommendations are used in final government 
decision-making. It tried to understand these few factors in-depth as opposed to exploring 
multiple factors on a surface level. It is possible that some of the indicators for whether 
government is respecting outcomes that were not explored would have indicated different 
findings. However, the tradeoff between breadth and depth is inherent in case study based 
research and there are pros and cons to each approach.  
Second, it is likely that many of the respondents who were willing to discuss LWR in their 
spare time felt favourably towards the process. This may bias the research by exacerbating the 
positive aspects that were reported about LWR. However, the fact that all respondents felt 
favourably about the program in some respect is an indication that the program is successful, but 
it is still plausible that important perspectives were missed by individuals who did not self-select 
to take part in an interview.  
Third, the absence of certain perspectives and spatial contexts was a limitation for 
understanding LWR in Ontario. The absence of opinions from water takers who are not on the 
WRT was a limitation for understanding the individual scale of analysis, but it was difficult to 
find contact information for water users that were not on the WRT. There was also a gap in the 
perspectives of provincial non-government participants in LWR. One respondent was from a non-
governmental organizations operating at the provincial level, but different perspectives would 
have been beneficial. In order to supplement the non-governmental organization perspective 
documents were analyzed to try and understand the opinions of Level 3. Additionally, comparing 
the experiences in eastern and northern Ontario is an essential component of understanding LWR 
in Ontario. However, this was not possible given the breadth of analysis required and time 
commitment for understanding different regional experiences with LWR.  
Finally, understanding how different actors (conservation authority, water user, 
municipality, or provincial government) perceive how collaboratively reached decisions are 
incorporated into government decision-making and whether outcomes are protected would have 
added depth to this research. However, this was unable to be accomplished during this research 
because of ethics constrictions. If the actor type of respondents was reported it would have been 
relatively easy to determine their identity given the WRT location. In the future including consent 
to report the actor group would be beneficial to add another layer of analysis. Understanding 
these limitations provides the opportunity for informing future studies into low water, 
collaborative processes for decisions-making and multi-level analysis.  
The requirements of the MOE under the PTTW program requires further analysis to 
understand how water restrictions are enforced during normal water conditions compared to low 
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water conditions. The opportunity to use the PTTW program as a vehicle for a prioritization of 
use should be explored as suggested by the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario.  
‘Government’ in this research was used primarily to refer to the provincial government. 
However, there are multiple government bodies operating at different scales. It would be 
interesting to investigate whether governments at various scales have a different understanding of 
the responsibility to protect outcomes and if their actions vary in collaborative approaches to 
decision-making.  
As collaborative approaches to environmental decision-making continue to be used for 
government decision-making it is essential that the expectations of government are articulated. 
The participants in the collaborative process must also make their expectations known for what 
they believe their role should be and how outcomes will be used. There needs to be reciprocity 
between government and participants in collaborative approaches to decision-making. Ensuring 
that the government is treating the input from collaborative groups in a transparent manner is 
essential. Government may be using the input from collaborative processes, but the participants 
may believe their recommendations are ignored if they are not directly referenced in the final 
output. Steps to ensure that collaborative bodies are being accountable to the general public in 
informing government decisions would encourage broader uptake of collaboratively reached 
outcomes.  
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
A) Relationships between actors in Low Water Response 
1) What is the goal of the Water Response Team?  
 
2) What is the role of (interviewees organization or water user) in the Water Response 
Team?  
 
3) What is the relationship between the (interviewees organization or water user) and other 
actors involved in the water response team (such as other provincial ministries, conserva-
tion authority, municipalities, and water users)?  
 
4) How does (interviewees organization or water user) interact with the Low Water Com-
mittee formed by the Ontario Water Director’s committee? 
B) Outcome Protection 
5) How is the work from the Water Response Team used by (interviewees organization or 
water user) for decision-making? 
 
6) What are the outcomes from Low Water Response at each Level (1, 2, and 3)? 
 
7) How are the outcomes from the Water Response team implemented (who is in charge of 
implementation, how does it take place)? 
 
8) Do water users tend to respond to voluntary conservation during Level 1 and 2?  
 
9) How does the WRT monitor their response to drought? 
 
10) Were your views incorporated into WRT decision-making? 
 
11) Do you believe outcomes were effective? 
C) Level 3 in Low Water Response 
12) How does the WRT monitor their response to drought? 
 
13) Have any of the watersheds you work with ever experienced Level 3 conditions? 
 
14) If yes, why wasn’t a Level 3 designated at that time? 
 
15)   Do you think this was the appropriate action? 
 
 
 
